

T H E

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ARTICLE I.

THE GREEK TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT AS EDITED BY THE "AMERICAN BIBLE UNION."

THE province of the textual critic is quite distinct from that of the translator. The one has no necessary connection with the other. It is one thing to determine, in the light of evidence, what constitutes the original text of Scripture, and a wholly different thing to transfer the meaning of that text to another language. The textual critic occupies himself solely with the former service; the translator is devoted simply to the latter. Accordingly, the work of the translator cannot properly be commenced until that of the critical editor has been finished.

The American Bible Union claims to have performed both these offices. Before attempting to translate the New Testament, it professes to have "critically edited the received Greek text," and to have "corrected its known errors." It thus assumes, that both these departments of labor lie within its own range of legitimate service, and that its servants are fully competent to determine alike what is Scripture, and how the text of Scripture can be most faithfully rendered into English.

The validity of this claim, so far as relates to the work of translation, has been already sufficiently tested. It is proposed, in the

present article, to subject to a crucial test the validity of the other and equally important claim. The inquiry will be instituted, whether the text actually adopted by the revisers is that which the highest critical authority has sanctioned.

By assuming to determine what constitutes the inspired text, and by announcing that the scholars to whom this work was intrusted were "the most competent of the day," the Bible Union has ascribed to its servants equality of rank, as textual critics, with those whom the world acknowledges as masters in this department. Nothing higher can be claimed for Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, than is claimed for these revisers. A life devoted to this single department of labor—textual criticism; long and weary years of laborious training for this difficult and peculiar form of service; decades of years employed exclusively in the collection and collation of manuscripts, in the comparison of versions, in the deciphering of texts, and in the sifting of evidence—all this is set aside as of little account. A few scholars, prosecuting this work in connection with other and conflicting labors, can—as it is assumed—determine quite as well, what constitutes the text of Scripture, as can these to whose supremacy scholars of all lands delight to bow, and upon whom the gaze of the world is fixed, as upon stars of the first magnitude in a small, but brilliant, constellation.

And here, for the information of those whose attention has not been specially directed to the history of textual criticism, it may be proper to state, that the great progress which has been made in this department during the last quarter of a century, is chiefly due to the three scholars whose names have just been given. Of these, the first has finished his earthly labors. The other two, with patience and perseverance above all praise, are still prosecuting their noble work. Tischendorf is giving to the public, in his eighth critical edition of the Greek New Testament, the results of his maturest thoughts, and latest and most fruitful researches. About two-fifths of the Testament have already been published. Tregelles, amid difficulties of the most serious nature, induced by the peculiarly trying service to which his eyes have been subjected, is carrying steadily forward, and with the assured hope of completing at

no very distant day—as we are told—that revision of the Greek text which, above and before every other labor of his toilsome and eminently useful life, seems destined to make his name immortal. He has already published about three-fourths of the entire Testament.

So long as the labors of these editors remain thus incomplete, no man, or body of men, can wisely, or safely, attempt a translation of the Greek Testament with the expectation that it will be generally accepted, and will prove permanently reliable. Not until Tischendorf and Tregelles shall have given to their critical texts the completeness which the narrower range of Lachmann's investigations enabled him to give to his work, can the way be said to be prepared for a popular Greek text, such as may be employed by scholars in attempting, successfully, a revision of our common version. A translation of *some* text may be successfully made; but the text itself may subsequently be found incorrect, and thus the translation be rendered—just so far—worthless. Any translation made in the present unsettled state of the text can, from the very nature of the case, prove to be only a *contribution* towards a final revision. Absolute certainty in regard to every portion of the text will probably never be had; and it is not essential. It may, however, be safely assumed, that the time is not far distant when a popular text may be prepared whose substantial accuracy no future researches and discoveries will materially affect. Such a text may be constructed from the three texts—when completed—of which we are now writing. Emendations of the received text in which these three critical editors *agree*, may be regarded as of unquestionable propriety. In cases where they *differ*, here, as elsewhere, the majority might properly be allowed to rule.

If these principles are sound, it follows, that any revision of the New Testament for popular and permanent use is, at the present time, premature. It follows equally, that any attempt to edit the Greek text in anticipation of the completed labors of the three editors already named, and except under their guidance, and in deference to their joint decisions, is simply presumptuous. The critical editing of the text must precede the work of revision; and

a popular text cannot be had before the completed labors of Tischendorf and Tregelles, in connection with those of Lachmann, shall have effectually prepared the way. It follows also from these premises, that revisions designed for common use, and prepared under existing circumstances, are calculated to destroy the faith of all unlearned readers in every version of Scripture. What the common mind demands, and especially with reference to the meaning of God's Word is, something that will abide when generations pass away; something which cannot be superseded, nor even essentially modified, by later studies; something on which to rest with implicit faith. With no sure foundation for its faith, the common mind can find no repose. It knows not what to believe. It incurs the danger of falling into the abyss of hopeless unbelief.

And here is suggested one fatal objection to the revised Testament. Being premature, and liable in each successive edition to be changed, it gives to the public no sure ground on which to stand. The reader can have no confidence, that the translation which is laid before him at one time, with the assurance that "the exact meaning of the inspired text" has been given, will not be superseded, in a few months, or years, by another translation from the same hands, yet differing widely from the first. And he will naturally expect, that a third issue of the New Testament, by the same revisers, will differ no less widely from the second. He will, consequently, lose confidence in all versions, and not improbably may refuse to accept any.

And this is precisely the position in which the reader of the revised Testament is placed by its successive editions. The two are so dissimilar that they cannot even be used together. The changes of all descriptions introduced into the second edition (1867,) mount up to THOUSANDS. They are so numerous and important as to involve the necessity of an entire withdrawal from the public of the first issue. That edition (1865,) was the best result of fifteen years of labor. And yet, the two years following gave occasion for a new edition with THOUSANDS of alterations. And now again, at the end of another short cycle of two years, still a third issue is called for, with THOUSANDS of additional changes.

In this state of the facts, the public are naturally asking, When shall we see the end of this trifling with the inspired Word? When will a translation be given to us which will *stand*? When shall we know that we are reading the teachings of the Spirit, and not the mere shifting opinions of men?

The answer is at hand: *Never*, so long as the Greek text is neither properly edited, nor accurately translated! *Never*, until those *whose business it is* shall have passed judgment upon the text, and those who are fully competent to the service, and who perform it with no sectarian aim, shall have faithfully rendered that text into our own language. *Never*, until a revision is attempted on such a basis as to secure the confidence, and command the co-operation of Christian scholars irrespective of sect or country.

But we are wandering too far from the immediate purpose of this article as already explained.

It will contribute materially to a just estimate of the real character of the work of the revisers, alike as critical editors and as translators, if, before subjecting them directly to the test proposed, we first show how they have rendered the Greek in certain passages where the text is not in dispute. It will be easy to demonstrate, that they have misrepresented the inspired text by *apparently translating* words which are *not* found in the original, and again, by *neglecting to translate* words which *are* found in it, while, in neither the one case, nor the other, have they apprized the reader of the addition, or the omission.

The attentive reader of the common version of Scripture will not need to be reminded, that the words printed in Italics, have no expressed equivalent in the original Greek, but are supplied by the translator. Often these words are clearly implied in the context, or in the peculiar idioms of the Greek language. Sometimes they are quite conjectural. In either case, their absence from the Greek text should be made known to the reader. He should be able to see, at a glance of the eye, whether he is reading a translated word, or one which, for some real or supposed necessity, has been supplied. He is thus not merely apprized of the the fact of an addition actually made, but is enabled to exercise some judgment for himself

in respect to the necessity and propriety of the addition. He is thus placed, if a non-classical reader, in a position of command, in reference to the translation, one step nearer to the position of a Greek scholar. He is allowed a glimpse of the genius of the language, a translation from which he is reading. He is granted a right of judgment—a sort of personal privilege of insight—which he can justly claim.

This privilege, which is freely conceded to every reader of the common version, is generally withheld by the revisers. We say “generally,” because in a few instances, especially in the Epistles and the Revelation, the supplied words are indicated by brackets. But brackets are also applied, in the revised Testament, to quite a different use, namely, to inclose words and clauses whose genuineness is doubtful. Accordingly, since brackets are thus made to perform two entirely distinct offices, the reader is in doubt, —provided no explanation is given,—which of the two is assigned to them in any given instance. Thus, in Rom. 11: 6, we read: “[But if of works, it is no longer grace; otherwise, work is no longer work];” and a foot-note is added, stating that “*Ancient copies omit the words in brackets.*” Again, in I. Cor. 11: 10, we read: “For this cause ought the woman to have [the token of] authority on her head, because of the angels.” But here, no remark being added explanatory of the brackets, the inference is natural, and can scarcely be avoided, that they perform the same office as before, and indicate words which are wanting in ancient copies, but which are found in those of later date. The Greek scholar—provided his critical text is at hand—will see that this inference is a false one, and that the words in question are supplied on no higher authority than that of the translator.

Commonly, however, the revisers do not *in any way* indicate the supplied words. Commonly, the reader is led to suppose, that every word which he is reading, has its counterpart in the original. A false impression is thus conveyed. And this impression is greatly strengthened by the fact, that, *in some cases*, supplied words are specially designated.

Now we take the ground distinctly, that, in a version of the

New Testament designed for popular use, *every supplied word should be clearly indicated.* There should be no room for a false inference like that just referred to. The reader should never be left in doubt whether he has before him the words of inspiration, or those of mere human opinion. The case would be different in a version designed only for scholars. They can judge for themselves. They can observe independently. They are in little danger of being misled by readings which are merely presumptive. And yet, such scholars are so few in comparison with those who can lay no claim to this thorough independence of judgment, that, even in a version designed only for the learned, it would be the part of wisdom in the translator, to indicate what has, and what has not, an exact equivalent in the original.

We are now prepared to show, that this essential characteristic of a version for popular use, has been—as a rule—disregarded by the “Bible Union.” Accordingly, we proceed to present a few, out of many, examples of—

WORDS SUPPLIED BY THE REVISERS, BUT WITHOUT INTIMATION TO THE READER.

Matt. 3:9: “We have Abraham for [our]* father.” 19:19 “Honor thy father and [thy] mother.” 21:46: “And they sought (ζητοῦντες) to lay hold of him, [but] feared the multitudes.” 23:34: “and [some] of them ye will kill and crucify, and [some] of them ye will scourge in your synagogues.” Cf. 2 John vs. 4: “I have found of thy children.” The Greek is the same in the two passages. Why should the reader be allowed to infer that it is different? And why should he be taught, that the word “some” belongs equally to the text of Rom. 11:14, where the Greek is: τινὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν: “some of them,” and of the passage before us, in which the word τινὲς (some) is wanting.

Mark 3:3: “Arise, [and come] into the midst.” These words are not merely a gratuitous addition to the text but a dead weight upon it. 6:43: “And they took up fragments filling twelve baskets, and [part] of (ἀπὸ) the fishes.” Is this the meaning?

* The supplied words will be enclosed in brackets.

The meaning of the expression, "part of the fishes," is, *some* of the fishes. Yet there were but *two* before the "five thousand men" had been fed. Probably the revisers intended to say: parts (fragments, remnants) of the fishes. But this is not what they do say. 10:40: "But to sit on my right hand, or on the left, is not mine to give, but [is] for them for whom it has been prepared." The revisers, by supplying the word "is," but without an intimation that this word is wanting in the original, have taken it upon themselves to settle definitively just what must be added to complete the construction. The common version is: "but *it shall be given to them* for whom it is prepared." Winer (N. T. Gram., Thayer's Ed., p. 451) says: *δοθήσεται* (it shall be given), borrowed from *δοῦναι*, is to be repeated after *ἀλλὰ* (but).

Luke 19:4: "because by that [way] he was to pass through." Here the preposition *διὰ* (by), though rejected by Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, is retained, and is translated "by," when standing alone, and "through," when found in composition with the verb "pass" (*διερχεσθαι*). In Matt. 12:43, precisely the same form of expression is translated: "he goes through dry places."

John 4:35: "Do ye not say, that there are yet four months, and [then] comes the harvest?" Compare with this the literal meaning of the Greek: and the harvest cometh. Why encumber the text by the word "then"? Why is this word needed any more in English than in the Greek? Why so translate as to convey the impression—nay, distinctly teach—that it *is found* in the Greek? 15:18: "If the world hates you, ye know that it has hated me before [it hated] you." This may be the thought of the passage, but it is not its construction. *ὑμῶν* (you) at the end, is not under the same regimen with "me," or with the preceding "you." The Greek is: me before you. And what more is needed? Why should the translator go out of his way, not only to add to the text, but to introduce a false construction?

Acts 10:17: "behold, the men who were sent from Cornelius, having made inquiry for Simon's house, [came and] stood before the gate." A more perfectly gratuitous addition to the inspired

text than this, cannot easily be imagined. It does not even throw light upon the passage; for none is needed. There is not the shadow of authority for this addition; and yet the English reader is left to infer, that the words "came and" constitute a part of the text just as truly as any other words in the verse or chapter. 13:34: "I will give to you the holy, the sure [promises] of David." This may, or it may not, be the proper word to be supplied. The rendering of the common version: "mercies of David," is quite as probably the true meaning, and is free from the ambiguity which attaches to the revised rendering. "Promises of David" may mean promises made either *to* David or *by* him. 22:26: "The centurion hearing it, [he] went and told the chief captain." What possible motive could a translator have for adding this dead weight to the text? It throws no additional light upon the meaning of the verse, it obstructs the even flow of the language, it suggests a false construction of the word "centurion," and is, therefore, a bald interpolation.

Rom. 5:18: "as through one trespass [judgment came] upon all men unto condemnation; so also through one righteous act [the free gift came] upon all men unto justification of life." Here are six words inserted in a single verse without an intimation that they are wanting in the Greek. Are not these words just as truly mere additions as the words, "caused it," in Acts 24:18: "Amidst which they found me purified in the temple, not with a crowd, nor with tumult; but certain Jews from Asia [caused it]?" Yet, in this last verse, the brackets are taken from the revised Testament; as though, among all the examples thus far introduced, this was the only case of addition to the text!

11:2: "Know ye not what the Scripture says in [the story of] Elijah?" Something may be needed by way of addition to this concise form of expression, "in Elijah," to make the meaning as clear in English as it is in Greek; but the translator should by no means convey the impression, that the added words *belong to the text*. The reader should be distinctly apprized, that they are introduced purely in the way of elucidation. Being a mere uninspired addition, they may not be most fitly chosen. Some other words

may be equally appropriate, or even more so. Thus, the expression, "the story of," is quite infelicitous, because the word "story" is now most frequently employed to denote a fictitious narrative—a *mere* story. Its primary, etymological, and dignified meaning—history—is quite overborne by its secondary and familiar acceptance. Hence, the expression, "the story of Elijah," is ambiguous. It would more probably be received, as in common and colloquial speech—in *the tale of Elijah*—than in the sense probably intended, namely, the history of, or, the life of, or, the narrative of, Elijah. Either of these explications is preferable to the one actually adopted.

11:14: "if by any means I may provoke to emulation [those who are] my flesh." This addition impairs materially the force of the concise and terse form of expression adopted by the sacred writer. Why not allow Paul to say just what he does say: my flesh, or, my own flesh? Why deny him the use of his own metaphors? Why exchange the province of a translator for that of an interpreter? Why attempt an elucidation of the text without apprizing the reader of this purpose?—without informing him that he is reading uninspired words?

15:18: "For I will not dare to speak of any of the things which Christ wrought not through me, [to bring] the Gentiles to obedience." Here, the added words change the construction, and greatly weaken the force of the passage. The Greek is: *εἰς ὑπακοὴν ἐθνῶν*: for, or, in order to, the obedience of the Gentiles—a concise, but perfectly intelligible expression. Why not allow Paul to write as he thought best? Why attempt to improve his style? Why dilute his language to the capacity of children? Why *interpret* rather than *translate*?

I. Cor. 11:10: "For this cause ought the woman to have [the token of] authority on her head." Here, the brackets are taken from the revised Testament; but, in making this addition to the text, the revisers again take the place of interpreters, and suggest a false construction of the Greek. "Authority" (*ἐξουσία*) is the direct object of the verb "have." Consequently, the only possible way of introducing, without violating the Greek construction, the interpretation which the revisers have here attempted, would be,

to translate and interpret thus: For this cause ought the woman to have authority [to wit, a token of it] on her head." But what translator, unless an avowed paraphrast, would presume thus to unite and confound interpretation and translation?

14:2: "For he that speaks in an [unknown] tongue." This addition of the word "unknown" occurs six times in this chapter. In every instance, the addition is strictly of the nature of interpretation. The added word is not even *implied* in the Greek, which literally rendered is: he that speaketh in (or with) a tongue (or language). This rendering is just as intelligible as the Greek itself. It just as little requires the addition of the word "unknown" as does the Greek. To make such an addition to the text is as gratuitous in the one language, as it would be in the other. It is as unbecoming in a mere translator, as it would be in a textual critic. If the word in question is added by way of interpretation,—as in the common version,—by all means let the reader be informed that *it does not belong to the text.*

15:23: "afterward they who are Christ's at his coming. Then [comes] the end, when he delivers up the kingdom," &c. This case is like several others already noticed, in which the revisers have not only supplied a word without intimation of the fact, but have, in so doing, taken upon themselves to settle definitively what the supplied word must be. Now the simple truth is, that there is—to say the least—no better reason for supplying the verb *to come* than the verb *to be*; nor yet, for putting the verb, whichever is introduced, in the present tense rather than the future. It is just as well to say: Then is, or, then will be, the end, as, "Then comes the end." Let the added word be put in *Italics*,—as it is in the common version,—and the reader can judge for himself whether the verb and the tense are fitly chosen. Let it stand as it does in the revised Testament, and he has no alternative but to suppose that the word "comes" is a part of the Greek text, just as truly as any other word in the verse.

I. Tim. 3:11: "[Their] wives in like manner [must be] grave." Here, the brackets are taken, in the first instance, from the revised Testament; in the other case, they are our own. But why this

discrimination on the part of the revisers? The two additions are strictly such, and should be so represented. It is in vain to plead that "must be" is supplied from the context ($\delta\epsilon\iota$, *vs.* 7); for, the word "their," also, and equally, is either implied in the context, or it is added in the way of interpretation. If the former, there is no more necessity of inclosing this word in brackets, than there is in any other case of addition to the text; if the latter, then does the translator become, *just so far*, a mere paraphrast.

But we forbear to multiply examples of this cardinal fault. Many more are at hand; but they point in the same directions, and lead to the same conclusions, with those already adduced. Were there no others but these, and could it be shown that in every other particular the revisers had faithfully followed some well approved text, this one fundamental error would prove utterly fatal to their Testament.

In this connection, some mention should be made of another fault directly the opposite of the one just developed. The revisers have not only in numerous instances *added* to the inspired text, but in some cases they have *subtracted* from it. They have entirely disregarded some words, translating precisely as though those words were wanting in the text.

Here might be adduced, in illustration, the numerous passages in which the double negative, $\sigma\delta\ \mu\eta$, is translated precisely as though only one of these particles was expressed. Very seldom, if ever, do the revisers indicate the *intensive* force of this expression. Almost invariably they render it: "not." The true meaning: by no means, in no wise, *minime, nequaquam, profecto non, nullo modo*, is generally—perhaps I might say, universally—discarded. Thus, in Matt. 5:18, the rendering is: "For verily I say to you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall not ($\sigma\delta\ \mu\eta$) pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." Common version: "shall in no wise pass from the law." But this defect need not be emphasized. There are other cases of entire disregard of certain words which are more important and indubitable.

Matt. 13:28, 29: "He said to them." Greek: But he ($\delta\ \delta\epsilon$) said to them. "The servants said to him." Greek: But the servants

(οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι) say to him. "He said: Nay, lest while ye gather up the darnel." Greek: But he (ὁ δὲ) saith: Nay, &c. This omission may appear to non-classical readers a very unimportant matter. To such, we commend the remarks of Winer (N. T. Gram., Thayer's Ed., p. 450,) on "interchange of particles." He says: "Wherever the apostles use a *δέ* they have always thought somehow of a *but*."

* * "How absurd to suppose that the apostles actually used *for* when they intended to say *but*, or *but* when they should have written *for*." * * "As the unlimited interchange of conjunctions is a pure fiction, so too is the notion that they are *weakened*; according to which even the more forcible particles, as *for*, *but*, are represented as being quite superfluous or mere particles of transition." "Quite superfluous;" this is precisely the manner in which the particle *δέ* (but) is treated in the passages before us—as of absolutely no account.

21:1: "And when they drew near to Jerusalem, and came to Bethphage, at the Mount of the Olives, Jesus sent forth two disciples, saying to them," &c. Greek: then (τότε) Jesus sent forth two disciples.

Mark 6:16: "But Herod hearing of it, said: John, whom I beheaded, is risen from the dead." Greek: John whom I beheaded! this [man], or he (οὗτος), has risen from the dead.

Luke 1:18: "and my wife is far advanced in years." Greek: in her (αὐτῆς) days. 24:27: "And beginning from Moses, and all the prophets." Greek: from Moses, and from (ἀπὸ) all the prophets. The omission, in the translation, of the second ἀπὸ conveys an impression that the clause, "Moses, and all the prophets" embraces only a single class of inspired writers, and covers only a single portion of Scripture. The repetition of the preposition—from Moses, and from all the prophets—indicates that two distinct portions of the inspired record are referred to.

John 14:6: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Greek: I am the way, and (καὶ) the truth, and the life. This case is not unlike the last. The sacred writer inserts a connective (καὶ, and,) between the first and second clauses, in order to detain the thought on each separate clause, and to give distinctness, and special promi-

nence, to each separate idea. The revisers, by casting aside the connective as "quite superfluous," have robbed the Greek of an essential word, and the passage, of no small part of its original point, and beauty, and strength.

16:17: "What is this that he says to us, A little while, and ye behold me not; and again a little while, and ye shall see me; and, I go to the Father? Greek: and, Because (*ὅτι*) I go to the Father?

Philipp. 3:6: "as to zeal, persecuting the church; as to the righteousness which is in the law, blameless." Greek: being, or becoming (*γερόμενος*) blameless. This word, though utterly disregarded by the revisers, is essential, alike in the English and the Greek, both to complete the construction and to develop the thought, which is this: In respect to zeal, persecuting the church; in respect to the righteousness which is in the law, being—or, having become (in the view of the world), *i. e.* having by my life shown myself to be—blameless.

Here are ten examples, in which Greek words unquestionably belonging to the text, have been treated as though not found in it—thrown aside as "quite superfluous." Yet, in every one of these passages, a special significance attaches to the rejected word. To prove this, is not incumbent on the critic. He has a perfect right to *assume*, that whatever is found in the inspired text *belongs there*, and is to be reproduced by the translator. He has no right to concede that any word, though it may be the minutest of the Greek particles, is unimportant. And the translator has no right to ask, in respect to any inspired word: Is this important? It is important, or it would not be found in the text. The only question for the translator should be this: How can the meaning of each word be most truthfully and appropriately expressed? How can the modifying influence of every word, in every clause, be most effectively reproduced? And the skill of the translator is far more severely tested by the words which are apparently unimportant, than by those which constitute the staple of a sentence.

It may be said in extenuation of this last omission, that it was a mere oversight. But he who publishes a translation of God's Word has no justification for oversights. There is no excuse admissible

for essential errors. If the translator, or reviser, cannot do his work accurately, he is incompetent for the task which he has taken upon himself. Thus, what possible excuse could the American Bible Union plead for their rendering of I. Thess. 3:8: "because now ye live, if we stand fast in the Lord." This is neither the Greek, nor the thought, of the passage. The Greek is: because now we (not "ye") live, if ye (not "we") stand fast in the Lord. The slightest reflection teaches, that it was the steadfastness of the Thessalonian Christians which Paul affirmed to be an element of life to himself; not, that *their* spiritual life was conditioned on *his* steadfastness. Yet the latter is the sentiment of this passage as it stands in the revised Testament; and this sentiment—though the exact opposite of what Paul affirms—is what is laid before every reader of this Testament as the language of the inspired Word. The public will probably be told, that this was an oversight on the part of the "printer"; as though the "printer," and not the reviser should be held responsible for this, or any other, error—especially for a fundamental error, like the one under consideration, which introduces a rendering equally foreign to the Greek text and inconsistent with the context.

We pass on now to show, that the revisers, in editing the Greek text, have alternately recognized and disregarded the highest critical authority; that they have alternately followed and repudiated emendations which, with concurrent voice, the three acknowledged PRINCES in textual criticism have sanctioned or introduced.

To present the proof of this, and at the same time to make the evidence clear to non-classical readers, and to those who are not familiar with the subject of textual criticism, will involve much of uninteresting but unavoidable detail. It forms no part of our purpose to go behind the decisions of the three editors whose names have been already given, and state the grounds of those decisions. We propose merely to compare the work of the revisers, as editors of the Greek text, with that of three judges from whose joint rulings there can be no successful appeal.

In execution of this purpose, it will not be sufficient for us to confine our attention to examples of *disregard*, on the part of the

revisers, of the authority in question. It is equally important to present examples of *concurrence* between the revisers and the three editors, in order to show that the former fully recognize the paramount authority of the latter, and to satisfy the reader that *the cases of divergence are of the same nature with the cases of concurrence.*

Accordingly, it will be necessary to classify our examples, and under each topic to present, first, instances in which the revisers have *regarded* the rulings of these critics, and then instances in which they have *repudiated* similar rulings. We shall show that Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles have *concurred* in making certain *additions* to the received Greek text,—their authority for the same being derived from manuscripts, versions and Patristic citations,—and that the revisers have alternately *adopted and rejected these additions.* We shall show also, that these three critical editors have *concurrently rejected* certain words and clauses—on similar evidence, in every case, to that just mentioned—which words and clauses the revisers have alternately *rejected and retained.* And we shall still further show, that certain other changes—such as *substitutions* and *transpositions*—have been made by these editors, which the revisers have at one time *adopted*, and at another *treated with utter disregard.*

WORDS ADDED by L., T., Tr., (Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles,) AND by the Revisers.

Matt. 12:38: "Then certain of the Scribes and of the Pharisees answered him (αὐτῷ)* saying." 20:21: "one on thy right hand, and one on thy (σου) left."

Mark 5:38: "and (καί) those who wept." 8:28: "And they answered him, saying" (αὐτῷ λέγοντες). 14:5: "For this ointment (τὸ μύρον) could have been sold."

Luke 6:14, 15: "and (καί) James;" "and (καί) Philip;" "and (καί) Matthew." 6:39: "And he spake also (καί) a parable to them." 11:29: "This generation is an evil generation" (γενεά). 11:34: "The lamp of the body is thine (σου) eye." 13:4: "above

* We inclose in parentheses the words which have been added to the common Greek text.

all the (τοὺς) men who dwell." 14:34: "but if even (καὶ) the salt has become tasteless." 18:1: "And he spoke also a parable to them, to the end that they (αὐτοῖς) ought always to pray." 23:2: "We found this man perverting our (ἡμῶν) nation."

John 7:16: "Jesus therefore (οὖν) answered them." 13:12: "he took his garment, and (καὶ) reclining again at table, said to them." 14:2: "because (ὅτι) I go to prepare a place for you." 19:35: "that ye also (καὶ) might believe."

These examples, though only few out of many which might be presented, are sufficient to show, that additions have actually been made, and to indicate the character of these additions. We turn now, as was proposed, to

WORDS ADDED by L., T., Tr., but NOT by the Revisers.

We will first give the rendering found in the revised Testament, and then the rendering as it would be modified by the necessary additions.

Matt. 7:29: "and not as the scribes." αὐτῶν: their scribes. 15:31: "when they saw the dumb speaking, the maimed whole, the lame walking." καὶ: and the lame walking. 21:9: "And the multitudes that went before." αὐτῶν: that went before him.

Mark 10:35: "Teacher, we desire that thou shouldst do for us whatever we shall ask." σε: ask of thee. 11:15: "he began to cast out those who sold and bought in the temple." τοὺς: and those who bought. It will be observed that the revisers' rendering contemplates but one class of traffickers. The Greek, as amended, embraces two classes—those who sold, and those who bought. The same person may have performed both offices, or he may not. The revisers, by rejecting the emendation, preclude the supposition of two classes.

Luke 16:29: "Abraham says to him." δὲ: but Abraham saith to him.

John 7:50: "he who came to him by night being one of them." ἀφ' ἑρῆρον: he who before came to him. And not only is this addition not made, but the expression, "by night" (νυκτὸς) is retained, though rejected by L., T., Tr.

Acts 7:22: "and was mighty in words and in deeds." αὐτοῦ:

his deeds. 13:6: "And having gone through the island." ὅλην: whole.

The reader will observe, that these additions which the revisers have rejected, are *similar in kind* to those previously introduced, and which were adopted in the revised Testament. And he should bear in mind, that, to disregard a reading adopted by the three acknowledged masters in textual criticism, is nothing more, nor less, than to attempt to set aside an unanimous opinion of the full bench of the Supreme Court. Yet, in all the passages before us,—and these are not exceptional cases,—the concurrent opinion, on the law and evidence, of these three judges has been treated with silent contempt. It has received—so far as appears in the revised Testament—not the slightest attention. So far as any influence in securing an emendation of the received text is concerned, that opinion might as well not have been rendered. In any given instance, had either of the judges withheld his approval of the emendation, not being satisfied with the amount of evidence in its favor, the case would have been much less clear; the decision would have been much less conclusive. The adverse opinion of one judge would have offset the favorable opinion of a second, and but one have remained to support the emendation. The same is true in every case. Hence we have restricted our examples—and shall continue to do the same—to emendations which have the fullest support, namely, those in regard to which there is no difference of opinion between the three editors. The field could be indefinitely enlarged by including passages in which *a majority* of the three approve or reject a given reading. But it is larger than we can occupy even when restricted as narrowly as indicated above; and, by thus limiting our view, we leave no room for doubt as to the weight of authority by which any emendation is supported.

We are now prepared to present examples of

WORDS AND CLAUSES REJECTED by L., T., Tr., AND by the Revisers.

Matt. 2:18: lamentation and. 5:27: to those of old. 5:44: bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; which despitefully use you and. 6:4: openly. Also, 6:6. 8:25: his.

Received text: his disciples. Corrected text: the disciples. 12:8: even. 35: of the heart. 13:40: this. Received text: this world. Corrected text: the world. 15:8: draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and. 16:8: to them. 17:11: first. 26: Peter. Received text: Peter saith unto him. Revised Testament: He says to him. 18:35: their trespasses. 19:20: from my youth. 20:6: idle. 22: and to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with. 23: and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with. 23:5: of their garments. 25:6: cometh. 13: wherein the Son of man cometh. 44: him. 26:3: and the scribes. 9: ointment. 42: cup. 27:35: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, They parted my garments among them, and upon my vesture did they cast lots. 28:2: from the door. 9: And as they went to tell his disciples.

Mark 1:2: before thee. 2:17: to repentance. 3:5: whole as the other. 4:4: of the air. 9: to them. 11: to know. 19: this. 24: that hear. 6:33: the people. 44: about. 8:35: the same. 9:24: with tears. 11:3: that. 10: in the name of the Lord. 12:27: the God. Corrected text: but of the living. 32: God. Received text: for there is one God. Revised Testament: that he is one. 13:18: your flight. 14:22: eat. Revised Test., "Take it; this is my body." 70: and thy speech agreeth *thereto*.

But we need not multiply examples of this description. The above are sufficient for our present purpose—to prove that the revisers have rejected certain words and clauses in accordance with the highest critical authority, and to indicate the character of these emendations. It has been thought expedient to give the translation, rather than the original, of the rejected words and clauses, as they are thus made intelligible to unlearned readers. The classical scholar can readily make for himself the corresponding emendations of his received Greek text.

Accordingly we now turn to notice a few out of many passages containing

WORDS AND CLAUSES REJECTED by L., T., Tr., but RETAINED by the Revisers.

Matt. 4:24: "taken with divers diseases and torments, and (*καὶ*)* possessed with demons." 8:21: "And another of his (*αὐτοῦ*) disciples said to him." Cf., vs. 25: "And the disciples came," where *αὐτοῦ* is rejected, as also by L., T., Tr. 8:25: "Lord, save us (*ἡμεῖς*); we perish." 12:3: "Have ye not read what David did, when he hungered, himself (*αὐτὸς*) and those with him." 13:22: "and the care of this (*τοῦτου*) world." Cf., vs. 40: "so shall it be in the end of the world," where *τοῦτου* is rejected, as also by L., T., Tr. 35: "I will utter things hidden from the foundation of the world" (*κόσμου*). 37: "and answering he said to them" (*αὐτοῖς*). 51: "They say to him, Yea, Lord" (*κύριε*). 18:11: Whole verse: "For the Son of man came to save that which was lost." This verse is retained and without mention in a foot-note. Cf. 12:22, where the words "blind" and "both," are retained in the text, but a note is added, informing the reader, that "*the oldest copies omit blind and both.*" Yet both these emendations are made by L., T., Tr. 18:28: "Pay me (*μοι*) that thou owest." 19:29: "or father, or mother, or wife (*ἢ γυναικα*), or children." Same in Mark 10:29. These words being retained, but not mentioned in a foot-note, the reader is left to infer, that they are undoubtedly genuine. Cf. 5:22, where the words, "without cause" (*εἰκῇ*) are retained in the text, and not even that degree of doubt in respect to their genuineness which the revisers express by brackets is indicated. A foot-note merely informs the reader, that the expression "without cause, *is omitted in many ancient copies.*" Yet L., T., reject the expression, and Tr. includes it in brackets. As the words "without cause" are found in the text, the remark, that they are "omitted in many ancient copies," would probably be understood by many readers of the revised Testament, as intimating a grave oversight on the part of those early transcribers, which—fortunately for the completeness of the inspired record—the revisers have detected, and have supplied the void! It would not be surprising to have this case, and others like it, adduced in evidence of the wonderful sagacity, and profound

* The Greek words which should be rejected, but which have been retained, are placed in parentheses immediately after their English equivalents as found in the revised Testament.

knowledge, of the revisers, that they have even been able to correct the readings of the oldest Greek manuscripts! Intelligent readers, of this class, would, however, be somewhat perplexed by the foot-note to Mark 11:8, which states that "*In the oldest copies,*" the reading is: "and others branches, cutting them from the fields." Their perplexity would arise from the fact, that *the reading in the text is identical with that in the foot-note*. They would be likely to inquire: To what purpose is this waste of words? A comparison of this rendering with that of the common version might possibly suggest to them a solution of the difficulty, namely, that the revisers *intended* to say in the *text*, not "fields," but "trees." From which it appears, that any reader of the revised Testament who has sufficient learning to construct his own text and then translate it correctly, will be able to make his way safely through both the renderings and the foot-notes of that remarkable book!

Luke 4:5: "into a high mountain." Cf. vs. 8, where the clause, "Get thee behind me, Satan," is rejected. Also, vs. 18, where the clause, "To heal the broken-hearted," is rejected. Also 22:68, where the words, "Me, nor let me go," are rejected. Yet the first *three* of these clauses are alike rejected by Tischendorf and Tregelles, and placed in brackets by Lachmann; while the *fourth* clause is retained by Lachmann, placed in brackets by Tregelles, and rejected by Tischendorf *only*. 9:55: "Ye know not of what spirit ye are." This clause is retained by the revisers, and the first half of the next verse: For the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them, is rejected, though *both* clauses are rejected by L., T., Tr. The revisers make no mention of either clause in the foot-note, thus indicating, that the first is *undoubtedly genuine*, and the other *undoubtedly spurious*, though *both* are pronounced spurious by the three critical editors. 11:28: "who hear the word of God, and keep it" (*αὐτοὶ*). Cf. 8:21: "who hear and do the word of God," from which clause *αὐτοὶ* is rejected, and on the same critical authority which would, if regarded, have led to the rejection of this word from 11:28. 13:35: "Your house is left to you desolate," (*ἐρημος*). 17:9: "Does he thank that (*ἐκτελεῖ*) servant, because he did the things that were commanded." Com-

mon version : "commanded him" (αὐτῷ). Both "that" and "him" are rejected by L., T., Tr.; but the revisers reject the latter, and retain the former. 20:14: "Come (δεῦτε), let us kill him." 34: "And Jesus answering (ἀποκριθεὶς) said." 23:55: "And the women also" (καί).

John 4:30: "Then (οὕτως) they went out of the city." 6:58: "Not as your (ἐμῶν) fathers ate the manna." 7:20: "The multitude answered and said" (καὶ εἶπε). 50: "he who came to him by night" (νυκτὸς). 8:28: "Therefore Jesus said to them" (αὐτοῖς). 38: "from your (ἐμῶν) father." 9:11: "the pool of" (τῇς κολυμβήθους τοῦ). 37: "And (δὲ) Jesus said." 13:36: "Jesus answered him" (αὐτῷ). 16:3: "And these things they will do to you" (ἐμῖν). 18:11: "Put up thy (σου) sword." 19:16: clause, "and led him away." 20:19: "where the disciples were assembled" (συνεληγμένοι). 21:14: "to his (αὐτοῦ) disciples.

Acts 3:21: "all (πάντων) his holy prophets." 26: "his servant Jesus" (Ἰησοῦν). 5:23: "standing without" (ἔξω). 25: "saying" (λέγων). 8:37: "And Philip said: If thou believest with all thy heart thou mayest. And answering he said: I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." The revisers say, at the bottom of the page: "v. 37 is wanting in the best ancient copies." They thus allow the reader to infer, that, notwithstanding the evidence against the genuineness of this passage, it is, *on the whole*, to be accepted as an undoubted portion of the inspired Word. They do not attach to it even that measure of uncertainty which, elsewhere, they indicate by brackets. In fact, they actually retain it in the text, though it is rejected by the three critical editors, and though Tregelles distinctly states ("Printed Text of the Greek New Testament," p. 269,) that "no part of this verse is recognized in critical texts." They allow the verse to stand, that it may be appealed to as authoritative, be quoted as if inspired, and be employed as an unanswerable argument from Scripture in favor of a personal avowal of faith antecedent to baptism. Other verses against which there is even less evidence of spuriousness, are inclosed in brackets, as if standing too much in doubt to be retained without this extraordinary safeguard against their being quoted as genuine. Thus, John 5:3, 4,

beginning with: "waiting for the moving," is inclosed in brackets by the revisers, though retained by Lachmann. So that we have here an instance, in which the révisers have practically rejected—by the brackets—a reading which one of our three principal critics retains; while the passage before us (Acts 8:37) is *not* included in brackets, though rejected by *all three* of these editors. Again, Rom. 11:6: "[But if of works, it is no longer grace; otherwise, work is no longer work]," is retained by Tischendorf, but placed in brackets by the revisers, who state in a foot-note that "*Ancient copies omit the words in brackets.*" Why is the extraordinary measure of doubt which the revisers indicate by brackets, affirmed in this case but withheld in the passage under consideration? Did the Immersionists deem this text too important to be spared? Did they regard it as their forlorn hope for proving, from direct evidence of Scripture, that personal faith must invariably precede baptism? In saving it for their ministry to use in inculcating and defending this—to them fundamental—dogma, did they regard a spurious proof-text as better than none? Why not then, on the same principle, retain I. John 5:7? One spurious proof-text is as good as another; and this last would be as formidable a weapon of assault upon Unitarianism, as is the other upon baptism without personal, saving faith.

To show that we do not overestimate the evidence against the genuineness of this passage, we will so far deviate from the rule prescribed to ourselves in this article, as to present, summarily, a statement of that evidence as given by S. P. Green, in his "*Developed Criticism.*" He says: "This entire verse is wanting in A, B, C, G, H, and more than sixty others, the Codex Amiatinus of Hieronymian Latin *pr. man.*, the Peshito, Coptic, Sahidic, Æthiopic, etc.

"The passage also exhibits that mark of spuriousness, shiftings of shape. * * * * * * *

"The whole is undoubtedly an artificial supplement, where the unstudied brevity of the narrative had left the appearance of an unconditional administration of the rite."

It may be proper to add, that this verse is rejected by Griesbach, Scholz, and Alford, and that it is wanting in the Codex Sinaiticus. C. E. Stuart ("*Textual Criticism for English Students*") says:

"This verse is not found in the Complutensian Polyglot, which was the first *printed* Greek Testament. Erasmus inserted it in the first *published* Greek Testament without MS. authority, supposing that it had been accidentally omitted from the MSS. he followed."

And yet, this verse, though entirely without critical support, is RETAINED by the Revisers; whereas vs. 29, chap. 28, is *rejected*, and the same mention made of it in the foot-note as of 8:37: "v. 29 is wanting in the oldest and best copies." Yet this verse (28:29) is retained by Griesbach and Scholz, and merely placed in brackets by Alford.

But it is time to pass on to consider, as was proposed,

CERTAIN CHANGES — substitutions and transpositions — which have been introduced into the received Greek text by L., T., Tr., and ADOPTED by the Revisers.

Mark 2:18: "the Pharisees."—Nominative for Genitive. 20: "and then they will fast in that day."—in those days. 3:29: "is guilty of eternal sin."—"is in danger of eternal damnation." 3:32: "and they say to him."—*καὶ λέγουσιν* instead of *εἶπον δὲ*: and they said. 4:18: "And others (*ἄλλοι*, for *οὗτοι*: these) are they that are sown among the thorns." 37: "so that the ship (*τὸ πλοῖον* for *αὐτὸ*: it) was already becoming filled." 5:5: "in the tombs, and in the mountains."—order reversed. 11: "by the mountain" (dat. singular). Common version: "nigh unto the mountains" (acc. plural). 14: "And they who fed them."—*αὐτοῖς*, for *τοὺς χοίρους*: the swine. 23: "that she may be healed and live."—aor. subj., instead of fut. indic.: and she shall live. 7:30: "she found the little child (*τὸ παιδίον*) laid on the bed, and the demon gone out."—Com. ver.: "She found the devil gone out, and her daughter (*τὴν θυγατέρα*) laid upon the bed." 8:29: "And he asked them."—*ἐπηρώτα αὐτοῖς*, for *λέγει αὐτοῖς*: he saith to them.

John 1:28: "Bethany."—Bethabara. 3:2: "The same came to him."—Jesus. 6:40: "For (*γὰρ*, instead of *δὲ*: but) this is the will of my Father (instead of *πέμψαυτός με*: him who sent me), that every one who sees the Son." 55: "For my flesh is true food, and my blood is true drink."—Adjective, for adverb. 9:8: "and they who had before seen him that he was a beggar" (*πρὸς αὐτῶν*, for

τυφλός: blind). 26: "They therefore (οὖν, instead of δὲ) said to him." Cf. vs. 11, where δὲ is retained, though in both passages, L., T., Tr., substitute οὖν: "And I went away and washed." 10:4: "And when he has put forth all (πάντα, instead of πρόβατα: sheep) his own, he goes before them." 38: "that ye may learn and know (γινώσκητε, for πιστεύετε: believe) that the Father is in me, and I in the Father" (for: in him). 12:22: "Andrew and Philip come and tell Jesus." Here, ἔρχεται is substituted for καὶ πάλιν, and καὶ is added, both changes being made on the authority of the three editors; but ἔρχεται is rendered as though it was in the plural, and καὶ is made to connect the two verbs, though it connects, in fact. the two clauses. The corrected text, properly translated, would give: Andrew cometh, and Philip; and they tell Jesus.

We turn now to notice

CERTAIN CHANGES—substitutions and transpositions—introduced or sanctioned by L., T., Tr., but DISREGARDED by the Revisers.

Matt. 5:30: "and not thy whole body be cast (βληθῇ) into hell." Corrected text: ἀπέλθῃ, go away. 47: "Do not also the heathen thus?" Here, the revisers have substituted ἔθνη, heathen, for τελῶναι, publicans; and, in so doing, have followed L., T., Tr.; but, contrary to the same authority, they have neglected to exchange οὐτω, thus, for τὸ αὐτὸ, the same. 48: "who is in heaven" (ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, though the corrected text is: οὐράνιος, heavenly). 13:28: "The servants said" (εἶπον. L., T., Tr.: λέγουσιν, say). Same in 15:12. 14:9: "And the king was sorry" (ἐλυπήθη. L., T., Tr.: λυπηθεὶς, being "sorry"). 15:39: "Magdala." L., T., Tr.: Μαγδάν. 16:26: "For what is a man profited"—The corrected text has the future instead of the present. 19:24: "kingdom of God." L., T., Tr.: τὸν οὐρανὸν, of heaven.

Mark 1:16: "And walking by" (περιπατῶν δὲ.) L., T., Tr.: καὶ παράγων, which, in 2:14, is translated: "And passing along." 6:24: "What shall I ask?" L., T., Tr. give aor. subj. mid.: What may I ask? 48: "And he saw" (εἶδεν). Corrected text: ἰδὼν, seeing. 7:15: "but the things that come out of him" ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, though L., T., Tr. say: ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, out of the man. 10:28: "Lo, we forsook all, and followed (aor.) thee." Corrected

text: perfect. 15:4: "Behold what things they testify against (καταμαρτυροῦσιν) thee." L., T., Tr. say: καταγορεύσιν, lay to thy charge.

Luke 3:10: "What then shall we do?"—Fut. indic., though L., T., Tr. give aor. subj.: What may, or can, we do? Same in vs. 12. 6:18: "vexed by (ἐκ) unclean spirits." Cor. text: ἀπὸ, from, i. e. by influences proceeding from. 9:50: "he that is not against us is for us." Cor. text: against you, and, for you. 11:33: "a secret place." Cor. text: κρύβαντες, crypt.

12:58: "and the judge deliver (aor. subj.) thee to the exactor, and the exactor cast (pres. subj.) thee into prison. L., T., Tr. give the fut. indic. in both cases. 13:24: "through the strait gate."—θύρας, door. 14:5: "Who is there of you, whose ox or ass shall fall into a pit." In a foot-note, the revisers say: v. 5. *In the oldest copies*: whose son, or ox." But if the reading, "ox or ass," is retained, of what avail is it to inform the reader that the oldest copies give a different reading: "son or ox"? This statement does not change the *fact*, that the revisers *adopt* a reading which the highest authority *rejects*. Tregelles ("Printed Text," p. 200) says: "without license of conjecture, the reading υἱός (son) cannot be rejected." Yet it *is* rejected by the revisers. 17:7: "will say to him immediately, when he has come in." Here, the word "immediately" is coupled with what precedes, though the three editors connect it with what follows, thus: *Εὐθὺς πρὸς αὐτόν*, come immediately. 18:7: "And will not God avenge (fut. indic.) his chosen?" Cor. text: And may not? (aor. subj.). 18:28: "we forsook all" (πάντα). Cor. text: τὰ ἴδια, our own. 23:29: "that never gave suck" (ἐθίλασαν), though L., T., Tr. have ἐθρεψαν, nourished, or gave nourishment. Here, the revisers retain the discarded text, and with it a rendering which delicacy of taste would gladly avoid.

John 6:5: "Whence shall we buy bread?" Here, the fut. indic. is retained, though the aor. subj. is the amended reading: Whence can we buy? 13:1: "Jesus knowing that his hour has come." Here, the perfect is retained, though the aor. is the amended reading. Cf. 12:49, where, on the authority of L., T., Tr., the revisers substitute the perf. for the aor.: "he has given

me a commandment." 18:11: "thy sword." Cor. text: the sword. 21:15, 16, 17: "Jonah." Cor. text: John.

Acts 13:23: "raised up."—brought (*ἤγαγεν*). 15:33: "the apostles."—those who sent them (*τοὺς ἀποστείλαντας αὐτοὺς*). 17:27: "the Lord."—God. 27:34: "a hair fall (*πεσεῖται*) from (*ἐκ*) the head of one of you." Cor. text: a hair of (*ἀπὸ*) your head perish (*ἀπολείται*).

I. Tim. 3:16: "And confessedly great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifested in the flesh, was justified in the spirit, was seen by angels," &c. This reading is retained in the text, with the remark at the bottom of the page: "*In ancient copies: Who was manifested. Or, which was manifested.*" The impression is thus given, that the evidence in favor of the reading adopted in the text: "God (*Θεός*) was manifested, preponderates over that mentioned in the foot-note: "who (*ὅς*) was manifested." But the fact is, that L., T., Tr. reject the reading which the revisers adopt; and Tregelles states expressly ("Printed Text," p. 230) that "the evidence in favor of *a relative* preponderates greatly;" and that "*A relative* is by far the best attested reading." He then gives the proper rendering of the passage, thus: "Confessedly great is the mystery of godliness: *He* who was manifested in flesh, (he who) was justified in spirit;" &c.

But the patience of the reader is already exhausted by this accumulation of examples; and we forbear to proceed.

The main position taken in this article has been abundantly fortified. The evidence amounts to demonstration, that the revisers have alternately followed and rejected the highest critical authority. Their critical editing of the Greek text has been proved to be a shallow pretence. It is, therefore, incomparably worse than none. For, the text actually employed being absolutely worthless, but announced as "critically edited, with known errors corrected," it becomes a false guide to the public. It professes what it does not perform. It begets confidence which it afterward betrays. It excites hopes which it cannot fail to disappoint. Consequently, it undermines—so far as it exerts any legitimate influence—all faith in texts, in translations, and even in the promises and assurances of

Christian scholars. How much wiser would it have been for the American Bible Union, to follow the received Greek text, than to profess to "correct its known errors," and yet, leave the work in its present crude form—an affront to the highest critical authority. Had the former course been taken, the reader would have known, at least where he was standing. He would have had *some text* with which to compare the revised translation. But if this course savored too much of reverence for the past to suit the radical spirit of the revisers, how much wiser and more ingenuous than the course actually adopted, would it have been for the Bible Union to make *either of the most approved texts* its standard, and then inform the public that that text would be faithfully followed. Such was the judicious and scholarly course pursued by Dr. Noyes. In his recently published translation of the New Testament, he followed the text of Tischendorf, and assigned the following reasons for his preference: "partly because I consider it as on the whole the best, and partly because I believe that it is so considered by the majority of competent scholars throughout the world, and thus deserves, more than any other, to be regarded as the modern received text."

In drawing these strictures to a close, we may be allowed to give prominence to a thought which has been already hinted, namely, that, though the proper time for a successful revision of the common version may not already have fully come, yet is it near at hand. That it must come and will, and that no obstacles can long retard its coming; above all, that the church of Christ cannot be, through all future time, shut up to an imperfect copy of his Word, imperfectly rendered into the English language, is beyond all reasonable question. No future fact of history is more surely and unalterably fixed, than is a revision of the English Bible. And nothing is gained by attempting to avoid this conclusion. Nothing is lost by freely conceding the necessity, and ultimate certainty, of revision. On the contrary, the cause of truth suffers greatly from every attempt to conceal, to palliate, and to perpetuate the undoubted imperfections of our common version. Let them be freely conceded; let the propriety and certainty of revision be fully admitted, and the friends of a sectarian revision will, by this very

admission and concession, be shorn of their strength. They will be cut off from their only impregnable position, and shut up to a defense of the exclusiveness of their own operations. But, to fall back on this position would be to acknowledge the partisan character, and the consequent worthlessness, of their labors—a concession too great to lie within the range of reasonable expectation.

That we do not err in conceding the strength of the position taken by the advocates of revision, the progress of this article has abundantly proved. Were there no other reason for revision except the necessity of bringing the Greek text into conformity with the results of modern textual criticism, this alone would be sufficient; and if the text is revised, a revision of the translation follows of necessity. The whole case may be summarily stated thus: the Greek text must be corrected, and with it, the common version revised. But the time for a final correction of the Greek text has not yet fully come; consequently, the time for successful revision is still more remote. The Bible Union has neither corrected the Greek text, nor faithfully translated any text; and what it has done in the way of revision has been done chiefly in the interest of a sect, and to the prejudice of the cause of Biblical revision, whenever it shall be attempted. With less hopefulness, and with greater distrust and suspicion, now than before the signal failure of the Bible Union, will an intelligent public regard any attempt at revision. But the fate of the revised Testament will secure at least one good result. It will strengthen the conviction in all candid minds, that the work of revision can never be successfully essayed, except on the broad basis of Christian union. It will serve as a beacon to every sect, warning it to shun the rock upon which one denomination split. It will show the world, that surely all scholars can walk together in harmony, if nowhere besides, at least when tracing back to their sources the streams which freshen the green meadows, and supply the still waters, of a common salvation.

ARTICLE II.

RISING FOR PRAYERS.

WE have a specific purpose in this article.. It pertains to the most important step in each man's history,—his repentance and turning to God. Any mistaken direction at this point must be of serious moment. The Scriptures and a true mental philosophy must lie at the foundation of all we do or say on the subject.

We have so often noticed, in accounts of religious interest, not only in Methodist papers, but in our own, that a certain number "rose for prayers," or "came forward for prayers," as the test or index of the degree of religious interest and progress in a church or community, that we are led to inquire: May there not be some who do not rise, nor come forward for prayers, whose interest and desire do not take that direction, who feel as deeply, and resolve as heartily for Christ as those who manifest their interest in that particular way, prescribed for them by their spiritual guides, without regard to their own feelings and wishes? By what authority, then, do ministers of the gospel prescribe this course, and count those alone who comply with it, as having any special interest in the subject of religion?

The scriptural method of preaching repentance and directing men to Christ is very simple. "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." "Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." "Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters." "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "The Spirit and the bride say, come." "And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."

An equally simple mental philosophy is involved in these directions. There is, first, the awakened mind, through fear, desire, conviction, thirst; second, the discovery of an accessi-

ble and adequate remedy for the disturbed and disordered mind ; third, a direct and hearty acceptance and embrace of the proffered remedy to the joy and rest of the soul. Is any fourth factor necessary or admissible to complete the term ? If not, why is another so commonly introduced at this important crisis of experience ?

It is claimed that the mental exercises of many are not clear, and that the will is not alert and vigorous in yielding to the required step. Hence, the resort to specific measures to help it in its movement towards the grand result. At different times, and in divers places, we have "the anxious seat," "the altar," "rising for prayers," and "coming forward for prayers;" not only in emergencies and on special occasions, but exalted to a regular system, introduced on slight occasions, and sometimes without any occasion. With the kindest intentions, under various appliances to facilitate and insure the desired end, the will is often paralyzed rather than strengthened, and the end sought only made more difficult and uncertain by the intervention of partial and gradual steps, instead of pressing the one unvarying condition demanded by the Master and his apostles.

Let it be admitted here, that we do not object to the occasional use of these means, when there shall be a clear demand for them. If so many, for instance, should wish for personal conversation as to render it impracticable to see and converse with them all at the close of a meeting, it would be entirely proper to invite them to retire to a separate room, or to tarry after the congregation is dismissed. If any feel prompted to ask for the prayers of Christians, in their great struggle with the powers of darkness, it is certainly proper and timely for them to make it known, either publicly or privately. It is not the sinner's rising and asking for prayers, if he feels the need of it and a desire to do it, that is objectionable ; but the imposition of that process upon him, whether he craves it or not. It is the introduction of this measure as a stated thing, as a part of the regular process in turning men to God, that we object to. It is the substitution of this preliminary and unde-

cisive step, on the part of the preacher, instead of the decisive and prompt surrender which Christ and the apostles demanded, in which the peril lies ; and the liability of the sinner's stopping and contenting himself with that preliminary step, instead of moving promptly and fully up to the divine condition, and yielding his heart and will unreservedly to the service of God.

We have noticed in protracted meetings where great promise was given to the "altar work," as it was called, that the congregation would be sensibly increased, near the close of the sermon, when the effort commenced to get sinners up to the altar. This was the climax of interest in the meeting, and the sermon was of quite secondary importance.

An article was published last autumn, in one of our denominational papers, by a Congregational minister, giving an account of "The Vineyard Camp-meeting," in which he said, "At the close of the meeting came the appeal to the impenitent to come up to the front of the stand for prayers ; moving appeals, ministers stationed, waiting. I heard no unscriptural appeal ; I saw no undue pressure, etc."

By what passage, in the teaching or practice of Christ and the apostles, is "the appeal to come up to the front of the stand for prayers," sustained ? Is it not, at least, *extra* scriptural, if not unscriptural ? And does it not, being made thus prominent, convey the impression that there may be properly a waiting for some further influence, before submitting to God ; instead of the apostolic method of demanding instant and unconditional repentance and faith in Christ ?

There are certainly some who do not feel the need of asking for the prayers of others before they submit to Christ. An interesting case is mentioned in "Power of Prayer," by Rev. S. I. Prime, of one who, after relating the struggles of mind through which he had been passing,—

"Remarked that he had never asked God's people to pray for him, and that he could not consistently do so until, from the lowest depths of humiliation, he had first prayed for himself. Then, in the presence of the congregation, he fell upon his knees and poured out his prayer to God for mercy." *

* Power of Prayer, p. 100.

Another interesting case is given, in the same work, of the directness and simplicity of mental operation, when the heart is thoroughly impressed.

"As our city missionary was stepping into the Sixth Avenue railroad car, he said to the conductor, 'Will you take a tract?' 'Certainly I will, and be thankful for it.' 'Are you a Christian?' 'I hope I am.' 'Where did you become a Christian?' 'In this railroad car.' 'How was that?' 'Why, you see I could not go to the prayer-meetings. I had to stand here all day. I felt very much concerned about my soul. I did not know what to do; and so I gave myself up to God, right here in the car. I cried to Him for mercy, and mercy came quick. God can forgive sins in the railroad car as well as anywhere else. I am thankful for the tract, sir.'" *

If one can become a Christian in a railroad car, in the midst of an exacting occupation, why not much more, after a clear and faithful presentation of the gospel message, preceded, accompanied and followed by prayer, as it ever should be, expect that sinners will at once submit to Christ, and immediately rise up and follow him, without the intervening process of rising or going forward for prayers before yielding?

It will be claimed, probably, that those who make use of these methods are more successful in winning souls than those who neglect them; therefore they should be commonly used.

Is there no possible fallacy or mistake in this conclusion?

1. The Apostles were successful preachers without such a method. So were Baxter, Doddridge, Edwards, Chalmers, McCheyne and many more.

2. It is not proved that those who have resorted to these methods might not have been equally, and even more successful, in following the more direct New Testament method. There might have been less of "observation" in their work; but "the kingdom of God cometh not with observation." The blossoms of spring are not the unfailing precursor of an abundance of fruit. Neither is the number, of those who go to the altar or rise for prayers a reliable index of the number who believe unto salvation. The statistics of the Methodist church, on this

* *Ib.* p. 146.

point, are truly appalling. Scarcely one in seven of those admitted on probation, according to one of their own authorities, "The Methodist," is received into full membership.*

The writer knew personally, on one occasion, some thirty or forty to rise for prayers in the course of a series of meetings, under the pressure of repeated and varied "appeals" from the preacher, not half a dozen of whom went any farther towards the kingdom of heaven; and this under the direction of a prominent Congregational minister. Yet the result was duly reported in the papers as "a large accession to the church!" Dr. Nettleton and Dr. Beecher sometimes made use of the inquiry meeting and other special measures, in times of general and deep interest; but they never gave prominence to any of these measures.

"There was a time," says Dr. Beecher,—

"When a question came up among us about the doings of unregenerate men. Taylor and I pushed for immediate repentance; we drove them up to instant submission." "If God does not demand immediate spiritual obedience, He does not demand anything. If he does, what are we that we should release sinners from the requirements of God? As to the proper directions to be given to awakened sinners, you may be certain when you read the requisitions of the law and the gospel, and their exposition by the Apostles." † "Mr. Nettleton made direct assaults on the conscience of sinners, enforced immediate repentance and faith, and pressed to immediate submission in the earlier stages." ‡

3. Neither does it follow that, in other hands, and generally adopted, these methods would not soon lose their interest and fail to produce the desired effect. It rather follows, in our judgment, that they would lose their force. It is the surface sympathy which such a step enlists, quite as much as any deeper feeling or conviction indicated, that gives the measure so much acceptance.

* The "New York Christian Advocate" estimates the number received into full communion for 1868, at about fifty per cent. of the probationers. Even that is bad enough.

† Autobiography and correspondence of Dr. Lyman Beecher. Vol. I., p. 483.

‡ *Ib.* Vol. II., p. 484.

4. Nor is it impertinent to suggest that, if the simple apostolic method of appeal has lost somewhat of its legitimate impressiveness and force, it has come through the frequent introduction of other methods, adapted to turn the attention outward to what may be observed, rather than inward to that which is spiritual and deep. The very common use of these methods by evangelists, so called, while it may be one of the chief instrumentalities of their success, if not the very hiding of their power, serves, reactively, in many cases, to weaken and undermine the ordinary means of grace, and to put the stated minister to disadvantage, in his ordinary efforts, by the comparison of his labors and methods with the more exciting and imposing methods of the evangelist.

If we analyze the measure, to discover the mental process involved in it, we find that it contains both a help and a hinderance; a help, in so far as it commits the seeker, and makes him known to the preacher and the active members of the church; a hinderance, (*a*) in attracting the attention and curiosity of others prematurely and unduly; (*b*) in disturbing his own private meditation and prayerfulness, at a point where no curious eye should be permitted to gaze; (*c*) in producing a partial relief from the pressure of conscience and the truth, and thus abating the sense of obligation to immediate repentance and submission by the substitution of another and partial step for the true and decisive one; (*d*) in distracting and diverting the mind, in some cases, from the great question to a minor one, viz., the right of another to insist that this particular step shall be taken by all, regardless of their personal wishes; and (*e*) in assuming that this or any other particular form or phase of religious interest must be equally adapted and helpful to all.

If it be affirmed that it is important for the awakened sinner to commit himself, in some public way, and that rising or coming forward for prayer has that effect, we reply, by conceding the propriety of persuading the sinner, at as early a stage as possible, to choose and decide publicly whom he will serve. But let it be done intelligently and honestly, not under a false

issue. Let him testify of his interest and his purpose, for himself, in his own way, not in the way of another. But let him not run before he has a message, nor testify beyond his actual conviction and purpose. Is it not just here that we may account for the enormous excess of probationers over actual converts, in the Methodist denomination—that sinners are urged forward to the altar, not on account of a personal consciousness of guilt and need of the prayers of others, but as a means of securing a result of which they have only some slight sense of need or desire to obtain? And is it not to be feared that many in our own denomination are committing the same mistake?

Moreover, we do not admit that the mind is dependent for its decision, or specially helped therein, by an outward movement of the body. Men are swayed and determined in their purpose, both in crowds and in solitude, both in action and repose of the body; but the decisive mental step is a personal act, not governed by the action of the body, whether the motive which leads to it be the result of a public appeal, where many are reached by the same voice, or of solitary thought, and the perusal of the printed page. What is the vaunted power of the press, but a power over individual minds and wills in a state of physical repose? The orator and the preacher alike are supposed to have less influence in determining public opinion and action than the editor, who sits quietly in his chair and pens the article which is read in a similar state of bodily inaction, but with the highest degree of mental activity.

We are pleased to find the following clear and vigorous utterance on this subject in our denominational paper of the West, "*The Advance*":—

"No intelligent minister means to convey the impression, as certainly he would have no warrant for so doing, that complying with any one method is a condition of salvation which must be accepted by the repenting sinner. But yet, his invariable and importunate use of a certain method may convey that idea to the hearer with evil result. The self-excusing sinner is rendered antagonistic and furnished with a stumbling-block. He inwardly asks: Who authorized you to add to the Bible terms of salvation, and to say, not only that I must repent and believe, but also that I must manifest my purpose or

act in just this way, by rising for prayer or coming forward to a particular seat, or remaining at the close of the meeting?

"At the same time, the sensitive, nervous and despondingly anxious soul, failing to muster courage at the moment to comply with the public test, is discouraged beyond actual reason, and tempted to turn from the means of grace. Christians, also, who, under a similar impression, witness the hesitation and refusal of such persons, sometimes err, either by subsequent harshness or by loss of hope and faith in their behalf.

"The great thing is, a spirit of prayer and labor on the part of the church, so that the minister may preach in a favorable atmosphere. Then, a clear presentation of the gospel truth, with a faithful, solemn and kind application of it to the hearers, urging an immediate surrender of the heart to the Saviour, will be effective, in connection with all the customary methods, and also outside of them all. Souls will reach the momentous decision publicly and privately, on their feet and in their seats, at the church and at their homes, during the meeting and after it."

"The test of excellence in a sermon," says Prof. Shedd, "is continuance of influence." * It is equally the test of all work in the realm of mind. The condition of this permanent influence is, careful compliance with the laws of the mind. The heart must be thoroughly moved and prepare to receive the truth; the vital doctrines of the gospel must be wisely administered, with the accompanying power of the Spirit; and the conscience and will must then be left to do their part, in conjunction with the truth and the grace of the Spirit. At this point, we believe, our responsibility for the result ceases.

ARTICLE III.

FAITH, IN DEFINITION AND RELATIONS.

THE April number of the "New Englander" contained an article on "False Definitions of Faith, and the True Definition," by Rev. Leonard W. Bacon, of Williamsburg, N. Y., in which occurs the following passage:—

* *Homiletics and Pastoral Theology*, p. 50.

"1. That *Faith is the assent of the intellect to religious truth* is the definition accepted, with some variations of statement, by all Roman Catholic theologians, and by a multitude, perhaps the majority of Protestants. * * * * Holding this as the definition of Faith, good men are at their wits' end to vindicate the good faith of God's word, which promises in so many words that whosoever believeth shall not perish, but shall have everlasting life; and then, in the very face of this promise—this broad, unlimited promise, uttered only on the single condition of Faith—declares that except we repent we shall all perish, and that without holiness no man shall see the Lord. Men are driven to this dilemma: either they must adhere to the doctrine of justification by Faith only, repudiating the other demands of the Scriptures, and maintaining an antinomian orthodoxy; or they must reject the doctrine of justification by Faith only, and save the interests of holiness by sacrificing the credit of the divine promises. It is the latter course which has been adopted by the Roman Catholic church, and by many Protestant theologians, including some of New England schools."—*New Englander*, pp. 252, 253.

In the foot-note attached to this last sentence Mr. Bacon says:—

See an admirably frank article in the "Congregational Review," for May, 1868, from the pen of President Magoun, of Iowa College. "Either [unbelief or disbelief] may be the leading form [of selfishness.] They were such with the Jews. They are not with those brought up under Christian privileges; nor is it true at all to say that unbelief is *now* the parent of all sin. * * * 'Only believe' is *not safe advice* to a sinner whose selfishness has not concentrated in rejection of Christ, as that of many Jews did." p. 216. So in preaching the gospel to the heathen, "there may be found devout religious men among them. * * * * In such *exceptional cases*, the missionary may preach to them 'Only believe.' Or they may be under conviction of sin, not having yet repented, and need first to be told how to repent. * * * * The gospel *does not fall into the blunder* and confusion of thought of telling men, however impenitent, to come to Jesus to be accepted and have faith." pp. 217, 218. "The saving of the soul depends on *two* things, and one comes before, and the other after, as their several objects require; repentance, antecedent; * * * * and faith consequent." p. 212.

It is impossible to accept these statements without feeling that our Lord and his apostles were addicted to a very reckless and "blundering" way of promising salvation on the sole condition of faith.—*New Englander*, p. 253.

The italics and omissions in the quotations are Mr. Bacon's. The writer quoted from does not feel called upon to notice the general statement in the body of the article, but only the specification in the foot-note. "Many Protestant theologians," and

even "some of New England schools," are expressions indefinite enough to mean nobody in particular; and nobody in particular is bound to answer yes or no. But if the present writer, being individually referred to, and the only one so referred to, should not "answer for himself," the statement might be taken as confessed to be true. On the other hand, if the only specific reference supporting the general statement in the "New Englander" should seem to have no foundation, perhaps the statement itself may come to the ground.

I. It might be sufficient then, so far as an individual is placed in a false position by the assertion that he "must reject the doctrine of justification by Faith only, and save the interests of holiness by sacrificing the credit of the divine promises," to reply that he does no such thing. He must himself know best. If that doctrine is eminently precious to his mind and heart; if no view that he holds of related subjects, as e.g., repentance, (which was the subject of the Review article Mr. Bacon has quoted from,) interferes with this doctrine in his own mind, or disturbs it in the least; if, on the contrary, the logical connection of the two doctrines, and the analytical distinctions he makes between Repentance and Faith, in common with "many Protestant theologians, including (not a few) of New England schools," are the very grounds on which he holds self-consistently the great doctrine of justification *by Faith only*, he must know it. And this the present writer knew when he wrote the article on "The Place of Repentance in Religion and Theology," and now knows. It is implied in what is said in the "New Englander," that he accepts the faulty definition of Faith from which the rejection of the doctrine of justification is alleged to follow. The one is no more true than the other. It is not material to add, but it may be added, that he regards that definition and Mr. Bacon's alike as false by defect. But with this difference between them, that it is far less certain that "the majority of Protestants" hold a definition so defective on the one side, than it is that Mr. Bacon holds one so defective on the other. What these defects are may briefly appear in the sequel.

So far as the particular Protestant theologians of the New England school * are concerned, who were cited in the article from which Mr. Bacon quotes as holding the views there maintained, it might be sufficient to put in a general denial in their behalf. Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins certainly did not hold the views concerning Faith and Confessions of Faith propounded in the "New Englander," and just as certainly they never proposed to "reject the doctrine of justification by Faith only, and save the interests of holiness by sacrificing the credit of the divine promises." The mere idea of their doing so is astounding. The title itself, of Edwards' third sermon, "On Important Subjects" (Works, Vol. IV.,) is a sufficient quotation, "Justification by Faith alone." In the sermon he affirms that "nothing in us but faith renders it meet that we should have justification assigned to us;" "this is said to be by faith alone, without any manner of virtue or goodness of our own." And then he proves it from Scripture; proves that "the way in which justification has a dependence on faith, is that it is *the qualification* on which the congruity of our interest in the righteousness of Christ depends, or wherein such a fitness consists." And he winds up by showing that "the opposite scheme does most directly tend to lead men to trust in their own righteousness for justification which is a thing fatal to the soul." In passing he gives the following explanation of his meaning, or "in what manner faith is the only condition of justification and salvation * * * in a manner peculiar to it, and so that nothing else has a parallel influence with it, because faith includes the whole act of union to Christ as a Saviour." This "is called faith in the scripture," &c. And though he confounds faith and repentance, and makes them one, yet when he distinguishes the latter as "*only so much* in justifying faith as respects the evil to be delivered from by the Saviour," "*so far as* it is conversant about sin," he characterizes the former as

* The Old School Presbyterian divines referred to ("Congregational Review," May, 1868, pp. 202, 203,) as not giving Repentance its proper distinctive place in religion and theology, abundantly affirm justification by Faith only.

"that in the justifying act (which) does more especially respect Christ." And though he seems to place the two on an equality, and even speaks of "justifying repentance," yet after all he gives faith, as such, a certain singular pre-eminence.

"We need not wonder that that in faith which especially respects sin, should be especially the condition of remission of sins; or that this motion or exercise of the soul, as it rejects and flies from evil, and embraces Christ as a Saviour from it, should especially be the condition of being free from that evil; in like manner as the same principle or motion, as it seeks good, and cleaves to Christ as the procurer of that good, should be the condition of obtaining that good. Faith with respect to good is accepting, and with respect to evil it is rejecting. * Yea, this rejecting evil is itself an act of acceptance; it is accepting freedom or separation from that evil; and this freedom or separation is the benefit bestowed in remission. No wonder that *that in faith which immediately respects this benefit, and is our acceptance of this benefit, should be the special condition of our having it; it is so with respect to all the benefits that Christ has purchased.* * * * * So that we see that no argument can be drawn from hence" (i. e. from repentance being considered as justifying) "against the doctrine of justification by faith ALONE."

Dr. Bellamy, it is shown in the former article, more completely distinguished faith, analytically, from repentance, and in his "True Religion Delineated," he distinguishes three kinds of faith from each other: 1. A spiritual sense of God, His natural government and eternal things, practically influencing the soul like things seen. 2. A spiritual sense of the divine all-sufficiency, creating dependence. 3. A spiritual sense of Moral Government and the Mediatorship of Christ."

"They are evidently in their own nature so distinct, as that they may be conceived of as distinct acts of the soul." And the last of these three, Bellamy regards as "that act of faith by which we are justified and entitled to life,"—faith in Christ's blood. "This is peculiar to penitent returning sinners." So in his "Glory of the Gospel." "We can be justified by faith therefore, no otherwise than as faith is that, on our part, whereby we are united to Christ—and so become interested in Him, in whom alone God is well pleased; whose righteousness and atonement alone are sufficient to satisfy

* This is certainly very extraordinary language—an accepting or trusting act spoken of as a rejecting one; but it is consistent with Edwards' conglomerating faith and repentance.

for our guilt, and qualify us for the divine favor and eternal life." So in "True Religion," &c. "This faith, this uniting act, being the condition, *the only condition*, required on our part by the covenant of grace, we being justified by faith without the deeds of the law, hence faith is said to be imputed to us for righteousness," &c.

Hopkins, like all the Edwardeans, held that a peculiar union to Christ is necessary to pardon and life, and that this consists in faith and in nothing else. (Works 7, pp. 461, 466.) He declared that,—

"Men are brought into a justified state by one, the first act of saving faith." (System of Doctrines—Justification by Faith.) "The promise of salvation is made to him who believeth. He therefore who believes and exercises one act of true faith, however imperfect and weak, comes within the reach of this promise, is justified and shall be saved."

And all that he says about this as opposed to salvation by works, in Vols. I. and III., goes to maintain the truth that justification is by faith alone. Hopkins, perhaps, more completely than either Edwards or Bellamy, distinguished repentance and faith from each other. That he did not sacrifice the divine promises, while he upheld the interests of holiness, the whole of his "inquiry concerning the promises of the Gospel," is proof in addition to the sufficient sentence quoted above. And as all these theologians recognize the particular element of faith which is rejected in the "New Englander," (though they by no means make it the whole of faith as is represented in the definition quoted therefrom at the outset of this article;) Mr. Bacon's assertion is left entirely unsupported, with no one to apply to, so far as we are at present informed. We are a little curious to know to whom it *can* be applied!

II. But explanation as well as disclaimer will be looked for. Our former article gave Repentance its proper place as antecedent or condition precedent to Faith. The passages quoted in fragments in the "New Englander," were intended to emphasize the fruitlessness of attempting or preaching faith without repentance. To deny our position is to assert that faith

will save without repentance, that men, however impenitent, can exercise saving faith, and that Christ and the apostles so taught; or it is to assume that the two things are one.* It is absolutely certain to us that there is more danger at this day from omitting to require repentance than from omitting to require faith, which is sure to follow it; that our churches are weak from a

* It is only just to the truth to restate all that was said, Mr. Bacon's omissions being supplied. "4. The relation of repentance to unbelief and disbelief here comes out clearly. All men are guilty of the former sin before conversion, some men also of the latter. A Christian after conversion may be guilty of the former; Lord I believe; help thou my unbelief. This is negative, a lack of faith, betokening a lack of love which occasions it. Disbelief is much more. But both are, in unconverted men, forms of selfishness. Either may be the leading form. They were such with the Jews. They are not with those brought up under Christian privileges; nor is it true at all to say that unbelief is now the parent of all sin. Nor is repentance of unbelief the whole of repentance; though it may be a large part. It is common for those to fall into mistake on this point, who are in confusion of thought as to repentance and faith. "Only believe" is not safe advice to a sinner whose selfishness has not concentrated in rejection of Christ's Messiahship as that of many Jews did. Even to them the first message was rather, Repent! If one truly obeys this, unbelief will go with his other sins. On the other hand, giving up no one of the particular forms of selfishness—partial in themselves—is giving up selfishness altogether." "6. The main point to be urged upon the heathen must ever be substantially one and the same. If accepting Christ as an atonement for sin were identical with forsaking the sins of heathenism, or analytically included it, it would be necessary merely to persuade them to believe in Him, and their repentance would of course, and of necessity, be therein accomplished. There may be found devout religious men among them, the law-work having gone before the Gospel, the Spirit taking, not the things of Christ, of which they have never heard, but the law written on the heart, and urging it home. In such exceptional cases the missionary may preach to them, "Only believe." Or they may be under conviction of sin, not having yet repented, and need first to be told how to repent. But the great mass of them know not what repentance is, or what to repent of, and the first Gospel message to them should make them feel the absolute necessity of repentance. And a full message the Gospel has on this point. "There is doubtless as great a number of scripture texts which represent repentance as necessary to pardon," says Hopkins, "as there is that represent faith as necessary thereto." The Gospel wisely includes the law, and it slays that it may make alive. It tells men of sin before it tells them of a Saviour. It regards them as impenitent sinners, an old designation and more accurate than sinners merely, for this includes Christians, though even this has too much slipped out of our religious language, while the former and stronger designation has in some quarters disappeared entirely. It does not fall into the blunder and confusion of thought of telling men, however impenitent, to come to Jesus to be accepted and have faith that his love and grace will have the moral effect of renewal upon them afterwards,—for such a coming to Him would be only additional sin, and no one really comes who is not renewed." Mr. Bacon stopped with the word "faith" in the middle of the sentence, which has only a comma after it in the "Review," and in our manuscript had not even that, the sense requiring none.

So Bellamy, "We are justified by Christ's righteousness alone. If you speak of that which qualifies us for and recommends us to the divine favor, pardon and eternal life, neither faith nor repentance have, in this sense, any hand in our justification." "Repentance is before Forgiveness." (Works, II., p. 379.)

defect of repentance, and *therefore* from a *selfish* faith; and that the teaching which tells men that faith is all they need is mischievous, producing just these results. But if one emphasizes repentance and restores it to its proper place, does he thereby deny that justification is by faith alone? Not if he does not affirm that it is by repentance alone. Not if he is unwilling even to speak, with Edwards, of a "justifying repentance,"—a phrase Edwards never would have used,—we may believe,—if he had *always* discriminated between these two conditions of justification as he did sometimes. Not if his great anxiety is that the conditions may be fulfilled on which faith is possible or is valid, as that which justifies. Not if he holds that faith being the last thing in the order of nature, and following repentance, it is the very thing and the only thing with which justification is directly and immediately connected. Not if he avoids the error, which Edwards did not always avoid, of conglomerating other things with faith, and leaves it in logical order to stand singly, "only" and "alone" in this immediate and direct connection with justification. And precisely these things and all these things are true in the present case.

Protestant theologians, and especially those of New England schools, have always maintained justification by faith alone, in opposition to, and to the exclusion of justification by works. But they have never supposed that when a sinner repented, having no works to justify him, he thereby came into possession of such works. Nor did they ever imagine that faith, following repentance in the order of nature and logic, brought him into possession of them. And as they have regarded a Christian's obedience,—which follows repentance, faith and justification, all three,—as impossible before justification—for "the moment a sinner believes," he is pardoned—they have never dreamed that his future obedience could be any reason for his being justified. That no man is ever justified without repentance preceding his faith, and obedience following after it, they have been unanimous in teaching, and quite as unanimous that justification articulates immediately upon faith and upon nothing

that goes before it or comes after it. And this because they have maintained—we are not speaking of evangelical or orthodox theologians, and especially of those already referred to in this discussion—that neither repentance, faith, obedience, nor anything subjective in the soul is or can be the meritorious reason for pardon; but solely the objective mediatorial work of our Lord. And therefore among subjective exercises of the soul justification is by that which appropriates the Saviour's work, and this is faith alone. Even when they have most emphatically declared that faith is holy, the sinner being previously regenerated, they have denied that faith, being imperfect holiness, can be meritorious; * and still, never losing sight of the fitness of things, they have only the more insisted that faith, being the only thing that joins on to and gives us the benefit of the merits of Christ, is the only thing that justifies. Nor have any accepted New England theologians in denying justification by works, ever fallen into the error of admitting that there can be any justifying faith which is not preceded by repentance from dead works and followed by living ones. Most copiously, and with iteration and reiteration, in didactic treatises and controversial publications, this ground has been gone over till there is hardly a conceivable shade of thought connected with the subject that cannot be found stated in every relation and aspect, especially in the works of Bellamy and Hopkins. President Edwards having triumphantly established the doctrine of justification by faith alone in a discourse which that generation silently admitted to be unanswerable, it was the work of

* "It is plain from Moses and from St. Paul, that no goodness short of sinless perfection can entitle us to the favor of God. Faith as it is our virtue cannot do it any more than repentance or sincere obedience. For nothing short of sinless perfection can do it. But faith is not sinless perfection. Therefore we cannot be justified on the account of our faith." (The Law our Schoolmaster, I., p. 398.) "And thus we are justified by faith, not as an holy act, but as a uniting act uniting us to Christ." (Cf. Hopkins, III., "The Law of Works and the Law of Faith," and Edwards, Vol. IV., pp. 102, 73, etc.) This position is not to be confounded with that taken in Finney's Theology, (Eng. Ed. p. 548, *seq.*) where it is denied that either works, faith or atonement, is the ground or foundation of justification, and these are all said to be simply *conditions* along with perseverance, sanctification, &c., while God's infinite, disinterested love is the only ground of it. Mr. Finney seems to have confounded the agent in bestowing justification with the ground or reason for which it is bestowed, which is a vicarious atonement.

his followers to show that the doctrine did not exclude or release from the other conditions of salvation. And this they did quite as triumphantly. They agreed in insisting that regeneration and holy love precede faith. Thus Hopkins, I., p. 454. "That is not saving faith which precedes regeneration and the new heart. Some have supposed that the impenitent, unrenewed person believes, and by this faith his heart is renewed and becomes penitent and obedient. This is contrary to scripture and all reason, which has been made evident. Faith implies a right disposition of heart, and therefore does not precede and produce it. *No person but a regenerate one has saving faith.*" The works of these men are a perfect storehouse of arguments against an impenitent, unregenerate, selfish faith, a faith not characterized and actuated by holy love. They regarded love as the whole of religion, and other exercises as but its varied forms. And when they deny that repentance and faith are "parallel" or separable conditions of pardon and salvation, and assert "that they are *so* implied in each other, and *so far* connected that one is not without the other," when the two taken together are "considered as one and the same complex act of the mind," it is still "viewed and *distinguished* according to the different and opposite objects to which it has respect." "Repentance toward God respects the term *from which* the sinner turns in conversion, and consists in a cordial approbation of the law of God, and self-condemnation for his sin, and hating and renouncing it in his heart. Faith in Jesus Christ respects the term *to which* the sinner turns, viz., God in Jesus Christ, or God manifest in the flesh, and consists in believing the gospel with all his heart, which implies receiving and trusting in Christ as an all-sufficient and suitable Saviour for such a sinner." *

* Hopkins has given in this connection a thoroughly analytical view of repentance and faith as "distinguished from each other" by Paul, (Acts xx., 21.) in entire accordance with that given in our former article. While he has abundantly shown elsewhere that saving faith "necessarily supposes and implies those exercises in which true repentance consists," he here expressly says: "According to this distinction, as repentance toward God is put first, *so it takes place in the mind first in the order of nature and precedes faith in Jesus Christ.*" Just so faith takes place in the order of nature before justification, next preceding, with nothing between, for nothing can so be the justifying medium.

We have desired to make thorough work in showing that neither the writer cited by Mr. Bacon, nor those with whom he agrees in respect to the relations of faith and repentance are among those "many Protestant theologians, including some of New England schools," who "either adhere to the doctrine of justification by Faith only, repudiating the other demands of the scriptures, and maintaining an antinomian orthodoxy; or reject the doctrine, and save the interests of holiness by sacrificing the credit of the divine promises," whoever they may be. It is time to turn the tables.

III. We proceed to show that our critic, by his definition of Faith, falls himself into the error he ascribed to others without reason. A writer who should confound any other thing with faith that is distinct from it, and then teach that we are justified by the two taken together, could hardly be said to teach or see the sole justifying relation of faith. And Mr. Bacon confounds so many things with it, it is hard to see what he can mean by talking of "justification by Faith *only*." When he comes to attempt a "true definition" of faith, having set aside all others as false, ("New Englander," p. 261,) after asserting the absolute simplicity of the true one,—and more than this, that "the very simplicity of the *act* makes it difficult to define it otherwise than by the use of a synonyme,"—he goes on (p. 262,) to show how complex it is! He says,—

"The act of Faith—of intrusting oneself for salvation to the Lord Jesus Christ—*includes*, not as a remote consequence, but *in itself*, Repentance, Obedience, Holiness and whatever things beside are demanded in the scriptures as conditions of salvation; and so the consistency and good faith of God in promising salvation to 'whosoever believeth,' while yet demanding these other conditions, is maintained."

He seems presently after to attempt to restore the simple character of the act, by resolving it into an "act of doing right," but this does not help the matter, since it is not the rightness of faith by which we are justified, as our New England fathers have so fully shown, but by something else; not by

the quality of the act, but by its nature. He has fallen into the very error of President Edwards, pointed out in our former article, but without recovering from it as Edwards does.* Denying any distinct place or character to faith which is not occupied also by "whatever things beside are demanded as conditions of salvation," he recognizes no distinct relations of faith which are not the relations as well of these other things confounded with it. For their relations are its and its are theirs; and we are held to be justified by Faith, Repentance, Obedience and whatever things beside are demanded in the scriptures as conditions of salvation, all in one,—and this is the curious sense in which it is held that we are justified by Faith alone. We will not say that such a notion is that of being in part justified by works. We will not stop to point out the special fallacy of "including *in*" faith, obedience, which plainly only follows it—for the works of the law *before* regeneration, Mr. Bacon cannot mean, therefore he cannot mean any obedience before faith; but we will say that it displaces and denies the proper articulation, the joining on of faith "alone" upon justification.

Suppose some one says that the rebel firing on Fort Sumter was the cause or occasion,—the direct, immediate, and only one,—of Mr. Lincoln's calling out the first seventy-five thousand volunteers—nothing else would have induced him to do it—but adds that there were other things that in some other sense led to this act of the President, mediately and remotely, such as the defenceless condition of the North through Secretary Floyd's treacherous transfer of soldiers, arms and munitions to Southern posts, and, back of all, the perceived and fell purposes long engendered by the system of slavery. Ah! says

* "There is something in faith or closing with Christ;" he says, "that respects sin, and that is evangelical repentance. [It] is that very principle or operation of the mind itself that is called faith, *so far as it is conversant about sin.*" But he is obliged, after thus stretching the signification of the one to include the other, (as had been the theological custom,) so that he could say justified by faith alone, meaning by faith and repentance together, to return to scriptural distinctions, and add, "These things do not necessarily suppose that repentance and faith are words of just the same signification * * * take them only in their general nature, (they) are entirely distinct." ("Review," pp. 203, 204.) He goes on to show that they have entirely different objects, even as evangelical.

an objector, that is not a true account of the matter! that is giving up the firing on Fort Sumter as the only cause of the call for volunteers. You must so represent that event as to leave nothing that is not "included in itself" to have anything to do with Mr. Lincoln's act. I will show you a more excellent way. The better account is this: The firing on Fort Sumter "included within itself" Secretary Floyd's dispersion of the national defences and the whole system and influence of slavery—in short, "whatever things beside" slavery did or purposed, whatever had any relation to the rise of the Rebellion. Would any one think he had bettered the matter? Would any one fail to see that this is ascribing the call not to one thing, but to many? Could the author of such a statement fail to make it seem ridiculous to claim that he alone holds that Mr. Lincoln's call was occasioned by the firing "only," while others "reject" that account of the matter? Would any one pretend that the peculiar relations of the firing—and this only—to the call are denied by stating that Floyd's treason and the general slaveholder's conspiracy preceded it? And how are the peculiar relations of faith to justification, as the immediate condition of it, denied by setting forth repentance as the immediate condition precedent of faith? Our illustration is very imperfect, because some other act of the slaveholders, some other act at that time, even in Charleston Harbor, *might* have held the same relations to Mr. Lincoln's call; while no other act *can* possibly hold the peculiar relations of faith to justification. The fact is, however, that notwithstanding Floyd and the slaveholder's plans, Mr. Lincoln would not have called for seventy-five thousand volunteers if it had not been for that firing; and so, notwithstanding repentance, obedience, &c., &c., Protestant theologians, and those of New England schools, quoted in this and the former article, hold that God would never justify a sinner were it not for Christ's atonement, and his faith in it.* Bellamy has an intense way of stating this:—

* Mr. Finney, using the term condition in the sense of a *sine qua non*, a "not without which,"—in distinction from a ground of justification,—"anything without which sinners

"Penitence is so far from being a sufficient atonement for our sins, that merely the defects attending the deepest repentance of the most humble, broken-hearted saint on earth according to law, that perfect rule of right, merits eternal damnation." (II., p. 327.) "He who is enlightened in the knowledge of God and Jesus Christ, believes the gospel with all his heart, repents, and is converted, still deserves, considered as in himself, and compared with the law of God, that perfect rule of right, eternal damnation as much as he ever did, because his present goodness does not in the least counterbalance his former badness."

With the whole body of the reformers these men maintained justification by faith alone as opposed to justification by works, and the atonement of Christ as its sole ground in opposition to any ground of human merit. Justifying faith with them was not opposed to repentance from dead works, or to repentance for not having any good works at all, but to works themselves as deserving salvation. Mr. Bacon does not hold to faith only—on his own definition—without repentance, obedience and holiness, for he lumps these all together with "whatever things beside are demanded in the scriptures as conditions of salvation" in faith. He logically holds that one is justified *by all these*, if he possesses them, and how in the world he can say "justified by faith alone," we are curious to know. Not in op-

cannot be justified, which, nevertheless, is not the procuring cause or fundamental reason of their justification," makes repentance and faith naturally necessary conditions, together with present sanctification, (or "full consecration,") and "perseverance in faith and obedience, or in consecration to God." He denies that faith is mere evidence of justification, and insists that "it is a proper condition or *sine qua non*; but asserts that "faith is often spoken of in scripture as if it were the sole condition of salvation, because, from its very nature, it implies repentance and every virtue." He puts the atonement upon the same level, a condition *sine qua non*, "a means of reconciling forgiveness with the wholesome administration of justice," "a means of securing the universe against a misapprehension of the character and design of God in forgiving and saving sinners." He ordinarily uses the word "implies" in quite another sense from Mr. Bacon's word "includes." He knows the distinction between faith "what it is,"—and the eighteen things he sets forth as "implied" in it—among which are "present sinlessness" and "the reception and the practice of all known or perceived truth." The theological peculiarities which led him to represent faith as one of the five "conditions" of justification, and their bearing on the doctrine of justifying faith are manifest.

Mr. Finney does not use the phrase "justified by faith alone;" he hardly can in logical consistence; justified by benevolence and mercy alone, should rather be his language; but if he rejects the doctrine, it is not because, with Mr. Bacon, he makes faith not one but many things, but because he neither gives faith nor atonement any pre-eminence over the three other conditions—each equally a *sine qua non*—associated with them.

position to "justified by holy obedience or good works," for these are included in faith. To be sure he does not hold to being justified by works alone, but by repentance, &c., &c., as well; but if this be not to "reject the doctrine of justification *by faith only*," what is it? It is perhaps an uncommon way of doing it, perhaps not, but it is one way.

IV. Mr. Bacon's attempt to define faith looks quite as singular on a close inspection. Definition, according to Archbishop Whately and the logicians, is (metaphorically,) "laying down a boundary;" it is explaining a thing "so as to separate it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields." A queer way, then, of defining faith, to obliterate the boundary lines between it and other things! Sir William Hamilton calls definition "an *enclosing within limits, the separating a thing from others.*" How is faith, we beg to know, to be distinguished from repentance, obedience, holiness and whatever beside, when they are all included in it and made one? This is a question of theological analysis, and sometimes such analysis is the most important thing in the world. It is a question of the confounding of distinctions. Scripture never would have discriminated faith from repentance, &c., unless there was some use in it, not to say that we should never have had the two words in human language if there were no use in making the distinction. Paul may have had a very "blundering" way with him when he distinguished repentance from faith, and declared that he had preached two things, with two distinct objects or divine persons, as essential to salvation; but he intended without question that we should do the same. Hamilton, Stuart Mill and others speak of a definition as an analysis, and as we are not without examples now-a-days of analysis of a doctrine yielding elements or "factors" that do not belong to it, and of books written against a doctrine yielding a recognition—without self-contradiction, too,—of the "factors" of the doctrine denied, so perhaps Mr. Bacon has accomplished some wonderful analysis of faith which yields "whatever beside" inspiration makes

distinguishable from it, as constituting, after all, the "factors" of faith. We shall see.

Our critic does, to be sure, once say: "The true definition of faith, as it is used in the scriptures, must express such an act as *implies* obedience, repentance and love to God, not in its more or less remote antecedents or consequences, but in itself. * * * * Obviously we cannot read the New Testament intelligently and consistently, with any definition of faith that does not make faith practically to *involve* the other conditions of salvation." If he had stopped with these statements his own definition had been less open to criticism. But he unfortunately adds, "the act of Faith *includes in itself* Repentance, Obedience, Holiness and whatever things beside are demanded in the scriptures." So Dr. Bellamy on "the nature of justifying faith," sets forth seventeen things which it "*implies*," and in which it "*consists*." Some of these are antecedent to it, some consequent upon it. In part they are the same with many of the eighteen things mentioned by Mr. Finney as implied in justifying faith; but present sinlessness and the practice of every known or perceived truth are not among them. Instead of saying with Mr. Finney that "every virtue" is implied, Dr. Bellamy says, "the *seeds* of every moral virtue and every Christian grace;" but neither of these writers falls into the error of confounding the things "*implied*," as also "*included*" in faith "itself." In ascribing this confusion of thought to our critic, we do not go behind his words to some supposed "mental content." We simply interpret his weaker statements by his stronger ones, his descriptive language by his professed and formal definition. He does once show some sense of what a proper definition is by refusing to include those antecedent and concomitant states of the intellect and the emotions which are commonly summed up under the title "religious experience," "conditions," "constant antecedents of faith," "in the definition of it." But his own language about this is singularly applicable to his own definition. "Your definition has tangled up within itself an endless coil—an infinite series of antecedents (and consequents,) through

which the inquirer would never make his way to the thing itself to all eternity."

Moreover his definition contains too little as well as too much. It errs by defect as well as by redundancy. Besides including other distinct exercises of mind, it excludes what really belongs to the exercise or act of faith itself. He resolves faith into simple and mere trust. As he has already excluded (1) "the assent of the intellect to religious truth," and (2) "a peculiar sort and degree of the assent of the intellect to religious truth,"—(these being "false definitions,")—he must mean a trust exercised without regard to intellectual assent to truth. As he also excludes (4) the antecedent and concomitant states of the emotions, denying that "emotional experience" is "a part of the act" of faith, this act of trust which is the whole of faith, is, it would seem, purely and only an act of will.* One objection made to including emotional and intellectual states is that this "perplexes plain minds by a complex definition of a simple act." It is fair then to conclude that faith is regarded not as a complex act of the whole soul, but as a simple, distinctive act of the will. Mr. Finney had so taught before.

"Since the Bible uniformly represents saving or evangelical faith as a virtue, we know that it must be a phenomenon of will. It is an efficient state of mind, and therefore it must consist in the embracing of the truth by the heart or will. It is the will's closing in with the truths of the gospel. It is the soul's act of yielding itself up, or committing itself to the truths of the evangelical system. It is a trusting in Christ, a committing the soul and the whole being to him, in his various offices and relations to men."

Though these definitions differ much in some things from that given in the "New Englander," as the only true definition, viz., "TO BELIEVE IN THE LORD JESUS CHRIST IS TO TRUST ONESELF TO HIM,"—they agree in this, that it "is a voluntary act, and therefore a just condition, a practicable condition for every

* Mr. Bacon's other (3) false definition, "that faith is a firm conviction of one's personal salvation," was utterly and exhaustively exploded by Dr. Bellamy in Dialogue II. (Theron to Aspasia, Works II., pp. 185, 224.) The work was so thoroughly done that Hopkins is brief on this point. So Edwards.

man, for every child," and that the voluntary element is the whole of it.

We shall not now state our whole view of the error of such definitions. Proposing ere long to discuss the place of faith in religion and theology, it is enough here to say, that such definitions make faith the act of but part of the soul, while it manifestly cannot be what it is, or hold the place it does in salvation, unless it is the act of the whole soul. Whether there can be any saving religious acts so partial in their nature is a question that may well be raised. It seems clear enough that repentance is not such, but includes intellect, sensibilities and will. And because of this comprehensiveness in it, different theologians, fixing their attention upon different psychological elements in it, have defined now one element to be repentance and now another. Whether there is such a thing as any act of will that does not imply and presuppose the concurrent action of sensibility and intellect, whether, especially, there is any great saving religious experience of will, that is not also an experience of intellect and moral sensibility, we will not now discuss. Professor Noah Porter, whose philosophical dicta will certainly be taken at New Haven, observes, in another relation, what can easily be shown to be true in this,—

"That the phenomena of the soul are unlike the phenomena of matter in this, that they are given to observation as essentially complex even in their greatest simplicity." "Phenomena of the soul can never be known by consciousness as simple. Every state or condition of the spirit is in its real nature, and must be actually known by the soul to be complex, even in its extremest simplicity." (Human Intellect, p. 91.)

"We do not find that the soul is divided into separate parts or organs, of which one may be active while the others are at rest. * * * The whole soul, so far as we are conscious of its operations, acts in each of its functions. The identical and undivided *ego* is present, and wholly present in every one of its conscious acts and states. We can find no part, we can infer no part, which is not called into activity whenever the soul acts at all. We can discover and conjecture no organs, of which some are at rest, while others are in activity."

If these statements are psychologically true, then *a fortiori* it is true that in a great saving act like faith the whole undi-

vided *ego*, the soul as intellect, heart and will is present and acting.

"Again, we do not find it true that the soul can only act with one of its so-called faculties at the same instant of time. Some suppose, perhaps inferring from a misconception of the doctrine of the faculties, that when we know, feel and decide, or when we perceive, remember and judge, we must perform each of these separate acts in a definite and distinctly separable instant of time. Consciousness does not allot to each distinguishable kind of activity a separate interval or moment of duration, but before its eye many such distinguishable kinds of activity are united in one undivided act. We might, indeed, conceive each of these activities to require a separate instant of time; but we do not find this to be true in fact. Not only, then, is it not true that the soul is not divided into separate parts or organs, but it is not true that it cannot act variously, or with all its faculties in the same apparently instantaneous act."

As it *must*, we add, in justifying faith.

Our critic in the "New Englander" has manifestly represented faith to be complex in a sense in which it is analytically simple, and simple in a sense in which it is complex. It really includes both belief and trust.*

The fathers of our New England theology, who are sometimes supposed to have given "false definitions" of faith in having defined it as purely and only an intellectual assent to truth, were far better philosophers than their critics. Thus Hopkins, (Works III., p. 679,) "Saving faith consists in the *discerning* and *belief* of the truths of the gospel and *cordial approbation* of them, and *conformity* to them, which is peculiar to a renewed, wise and understanding heart." He denies that it is an act of the intellect alone. (III., p. 680.) Under one of his "false definitions" (2) Mr. Bacon says, that one Protestant writer makes one particular tenet or dogma the object of faith, another another, adding that "writers with whom we are more familiar, hold that the doctrine of general atonement—the doctrine that Christ died for our sins—is the precise object of saving faith." The citations in his foot-note are, "Sacra-

* Bellamy, I., p. 338.

mental Sermons by J. W. Alexander, p. 222. See also President Magoun in "Congregational Review, May, 1868." We cannot speak for Dr. Alexander, but as for our own article, we expressly said, "Faith in Christ as an atoning Savior, is pre-eminently an act of the heart," * and spoke of it,—in the few instances in which it was characterized,—as "accepting *Christ*," "the spiritual receiving of *Christ*." We did not limit it to the intellect; we expressly recognized its personal object. In another note Mr. Bacon asserts that "the growth of just views of the object of faith as a PERSON, and not a proposition, stands, no doubt, in close connection with the prevailing direction of recent theology to the study of the life and person of Jesus Christ—the best 'improvement in theology' since the Reformation." But the very men who are supposed to teach faith in a proposition merely, saw all that is true in this "new direction" long ago. Thus Bellamy, (I., p. 409,) "justifying faith hath for its object JESUS CHRIST." There is a broad church tendency which is in some quarters, emasculating and frittering away theology, by giving the biographical element in the life and person of Christ undue pre-eminence, sinking all doctrine in a mere historical interest in him, substituting the PERSON for the PASSION, teaching men that it matters not what they believe about Christ, so they do but personally trust him, giving them to 'understand often, indeed, that it is of no consequence if they believe next to nothing. This is in fact only a new form of the old fallacy that harassed our New England fathers, "no matter what a man believes if he is only sincere and lives right." We take an eager interest in all the real advance made in appreciating "the Christ of History," but we are not ashamed to say that our chief interest is in him as "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." What men *mean* by Christ, what sort of a Christ they trust in, and for what, is in our view of immense importance. It has everything to do with living right. Superficial people everywhere are saying: "No matter

* Compare Hopkins I., p. 448, III., pp. 590, 679, 680, and 533-535.

what your views of Christ are, Christ himself it is that will save you." We still agree with grand old Bellamy that Christian "views and dispositions are ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, in order to a sinner's *understandingly* and *consistently* exercising faith in Christ, to the end he may be justified in him." We have no doubt of the depth or the soundness of a massive sentence of his which reads thus:—

"Justifying faith, these views and tempers being thus supposed and implied, consists more especially in a cordial compliance with the gospel way of life, by trusting in and entirely depending upon Jesus Christ; that Lamb of God, typically slain in daily sacrifices from the foundation of the world, who in the fulness of time bore our sins in his own body on the tree; died, the just for the unjust; being set forth to be a propitiation for sin, that God might be just; and who is now ascended into heaven, to appear as our great High Priest in the presence of God, and is able to save to the uttermost all that come to God by him."

Never was the truth that it is Christ himself that saves, more nobly and incisively propounded than in the late address of the Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, Rev. R. W. Dale. The *English Independent* says, that the only criticism made on this remarkable address is that

"'Preaching CHRIST,' was interpreted by Mr. Dale in too narrow a sense, and that he presented the CHRIST of the Evangelists rather than the CHRIST of the Epistles—that he insisted on the personal excellencies of our Lord at the expense of the theological developments of His work, and would have the sermon made up of the facts of our Lord's history, without showing how every part of human life should be imbued with His spirit."

Yet Mr. Dale emphatically and eloquently recognizes thorough evangelical views of Christ's character, office, and work, "as the atonement for the sins of the world."

"Let us preach Christ," he says, "and we shall find that *He* carries conviction where our logic fails. Let us dwell upon the love which moved Him to descend from His eternal throne, and to become incarnate. * * * Let men see Him hanging on the cross, and let the glory He had forsaken blend with all the anguish and desolation and shame. Let them have the mystery interpreted by His own words, that His blood was 'shed for the remission of

sins.' Let us constantly reiterate that 'He is the propitiation for the sins of the world; that He died, the just for the unjust, to bring us to God. And while men are filled with wonder and fear, and gratitude and hope, be sure of it, all thought of associating their own penitence or their own well-doing with that One Perfect Sacrifice will vanish, and the heart, if not the intellect, will exclaim that *since Christ has died to save us, His death must be THE SOLITARY AND ADEQUATE GROUND OF OUR SALVATION*; and when the heart is relying on Him alone, and on Him absolutely, for the forgiveness of sin and eternal life, the doctrine of justification by works will perish in the fires of passionate love, gratitude, and joy."

Here is doctrine, noble doctrine, sound doctrine, the doctrine according to godliness. And with all its fervid assertion of the affectional and emotional element in faith, here is a recognition also of the intellectual element. Mr. Bacon characterizes fitly "those silly sneers at sound and sober theology which disfigure some of the most popular and eloquent Christian teaching of the day." But his attempted divorce of faith from theology will never stop these sneers. He considers them as a reaction from "that use of doctrine by which it has been set up as the test of church-fellowship and the condition of salvation." He implies that our Congregational churches have done this thing and caused this reaction. But the doctrine according to godliness is in the Scriptures made of vital importance to that faith which our churches have held as the condition of salvation. Not to recognize this is to hold that error may just as well consist with faith as truth. And fellowship, in the truth, is *one part* of Christian fellowship. All this, however, quite falls short of making doctrine *the* test of fellowship, or *the* condition of salvation. And the critic is quite as wide of the mark when he asserts that our Confessions of Faith are really nothing of the kind, but merely "Articles of Doctrine;" that "the very name of these documents is a misnomer." If it were true, they might still have their use, for the emotional and voluntary element of faith is always expressed in the Church Covenant, and somehow Christians who enter into Church fellowship, should show that they agree *in the truth*, and not in indifference as to truth or error. But the assertion is not true. The

heart of the churches has always expressed itself in the creed ; the Articles have always confessed Christ ; the Church therein uttering its trust in Christ as the only divine and all-sufficient Saviour, and its purpose to cling to Him, and Him only, as well as its intellectual view of what He is and has done.

Some minor points we meant to have touched upon, but the discussion has grown upon our hands. One only we will notice. Mr. Bacon constructs four tests of a true definition of faith, and his own definition fails under his first test. "The true definition of faith must express the natural meaning of the word under the limitation with which it is construed in the Scriptures, and no other." But to exclude the intellectual and emotional elements is to depart from the natural meaning of the word. Therefore, the younger Edwards, (Works, II., 148,) when he sets forth saving faith as a "complex exercise, implying both an assent of the understanding and a consent of the will," inquires, "Why must we understand the word faith, which occurs so often in Scripture, in this complex sense? Should we not rather understand it in the common sense of the word, as meaning a bare assent of the understanding to testimony?" That this is its primary meaning is unquestionable, and therefore Dr. Chalmers was led to use it as the only one. But it is also unquestionable that more than the primary assent of the understanding is included in it in common use and in Scripture. Defective definitions may suggest delusive expectations of clearing away difficulties, and may attract by their apparent simplicity. But the simplicity will be found, as in this case, contrary to the truth of things, and the defects of definition will always in the end increase difficulties instead of clearing them way. There is no danger whatever that an accurate and adequate definition of faith will "reduce the thoughtful men of our own day to the sad alternative which divided the theologians of Luther's time—the choice between the peril of antinomianism and the rejection of justification by faith;" the New England creeds, which are accused of a tendency to this, have been the strongholds of defence against it. They may not

have been all right, nothing human can be deemed to be so, but they certainly were not "ALL WRONG; they nurtured a correct, intelligent, and true faith, which was itself, under God, an insurance against error, and against the emasculating tendency to belittle theological and scriptural truth; and under their potent and happy influence those who have made the ancient churches of New England beautiful and noble have been "kept by the mighty power of God through faith unto salvation."

ARTICLE IV.

CHURCH DISCIPLINE.

By REV. S. B. GOODENOW.

(An Essay read before Grinnell Association, Iowa, and published by their request.)

PRELIMINARY STEPS OF LABOR.

THE proper and only allowable method of individual procedure in cases of offence, is prescribed in the great Law of Christ. (Matt. 18: 15, 17.) No person is permitted to tell his complaints in any other way; and any one so doing, is liable to the instant censure of the church. Every individual has the privilege, nay, the obligation, *thus* to settle his grievances at once, without allowing them to fester and mar his fellowship. Church discipline proper has here three preliminary steps, relating (1) to an individual aggrieved, (2) to two or more persons cognizant of a complaint or offence, and (3) to the church informed of such an affair.

1. "If thy brother shall trespass against thee." An individual thus aggrieved is not only one against whom directly a real or supposed trespass has been committed; but it is any one who thinks that any sort of offence has been committed, calling for discipline, labor or remonstrance. For a church member to do any disciplinable act, (public or private,) is to "trespass against" *every other* member of the church; and every member knowing it is bound as one aggrieved to commence the

proper discipline. The exact course is marked out in v. 15, 16. "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more; that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established." In this way alone can any Christian complaint be properly set on foot.

2. "Take with thee one or two more." Two or three persons thus informed of a grievance, which one of their number has ineffectually attempted to adjust, constitute (by the appointment of Christ,) a sort of lower court or tribunal, for the settlement of the case. If any two or three members, (the officers of a church for instance,) thus in common know of an offence for which no one has commenced labor, they are bound to see that one at least of their number does thus "go and tell" the fault alone. And they are thus all to become satisfied, or else to proceed together for an adjustment. And when they have thus together visited an offender, their course is exactly marked out in v. 17. "And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church. It is not allowable even now to tell it promiscuously abroad, but only *to the church*; and any other mode of telling complaints even to the church, should not be allowed. Not until the lower tribunal of two or three has labored ineffectually, can an offence be thus carried up properly to the higher and final judicatory, the church.

3. "Tell it unto the church." When a grievance is thus told to the church, the last court of appeal* must proceed to consider and determine the case. First, a citation is issued to the defendant, with a copy of the complaint against him, and with ample opportunity allowed him for defence. Thereupon, the case must be fairly tried; and only after suitable evidence can

* We use this sort of metaphor for the benefit of those who attach much importance to the idea of *courts* and *appeals*, in religious as in civil matters. What need have we of any higher tribunal, whether presbytery or synod, when Christ has arranged the whole order of judicatories and the whole process of appeal in this simple rule of Matt. 18th?

the church assert or recognize the charge as well grounded. Then follows church labor for the recovery of the offender.

But what shall be done when a complaint gets into the church irregularly, (as will sometimes occur, notwithstanding the best effort to prevent it,) or when some one in meeting wrongfully lets fall a charge or the rumor of a charge against some member? Answer: The church will at once censure the individual wrongly complaining. And the complaint itself, unless fully withdrawn, (which may be impossible,) must be, not *entered* as a charge, but cleared up by the church, for its own sake and the sake of the person accused. This is done either by an instant vote of acquittal or by *imitating* as far as possible the preliminary steps required by the rule of Christ, some one being appointed to visit and report.*

Here some greatly err, to the sad derangement of our churches. They argue, that, because it is not the duty of complainants to take regular steps before coming to the church, and because the church is bound to keep out, if possible, all complaints not coming in this regular mode; *therefore* the church must *pay no attention* to any complaint which is actually (though not regularly) before it, and must refuse to take any action concerning it. This is poor logic; the inference does not follow from the premise. The previous steps are enjoined by Christ upon the *individual* concerned; they are *not a command given to the church*. The only part of the rule applying to the church is the last verse, which shows how to treat an

* This is the treatment for notorious scandal and charges challenged for investigation, as well as for all offences so public as to come out (whether rightly or wrongly,) in open church meeting. But it is only an *imitation* of the steps as intended by Christ. For the virtue of the real steps consists (1) in their being not only private, but *previous* to the knowledge of the church, so that (2) they may, if resulting in a settlement, never be publicly known. But in the case before us, the labor *follows* church action, and so (whatever the result,) must be reported to the church in order to end the matter. The one appointed to commence labor need not be the complainant himself; for, in many cases, his very act of complaining irregularly has unfitted him for this position. And on this very account we see the necessity that the church control the whole matter when thus before it, (as here argued,) by appointment made and speedy report required. Ignoring the whole matter because not regularly introduced, leaves it to be very badly managed, and probably not adjusted at all.

affair *when it is once told to the church*. Then the church is bound to have *its voice heard*, whether individuals have done their part or not. Else a scandal thus rests upon the cause, as alas! we too often see in the prevalent neglect of this course.

DISCIPLINE FOR TWO SORTS OF OFFENCES.

A church as such has cognizance of two sorts of offences, (1) *alleged* offences, and (2) *conceded* offences.

1. ALLEGED OFFENCES. These come before the church through preliminary steps of labor, as already explained, and require to be *proved* by means of a regular *trial*. The rule is at Matt. 18th, "Tell it to the church," that is, bring out the whole matter by means of trial before the church. Thereupon let the church speak, giving its verdict, and, in case of guilt, commencing its own church labor proper for the recovery of the offender. The verdict of guilt itself *suspends* the offender from church privileges until his case can be adjusted;* and the labor then proceeds directly or through committee by means of admonition, one or more, according to the nature of the case. To "hear the church," is first, to hear and obey the church's citation in a case of complaint; and secondly, upon the church's recognition of offence and consequent suspension, to hear and submit, by rendering such explanation or confession as will restore the standing and end the case; or thirdly, upon admonition, to confess and forsake the wrong.

"But if he neglects to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican." That is, *excommunicate* him. This must be the final result in every case of obstinacy. But excommunication is of two sorts, the *lesser* by mere relinquishment or "withdrawal of fellowship," and the *greater* by direct expulsion. The milder form may be used in cases of mere delinquency and failure of covenant duty, without active sin,—in cases of honest change in sentiment and consequent

* "If the church decides that the charges, or any considerable portion of them are sustained, the offender is suspended from communion, and an admonition is sent to him." Pond on "The Church," p. 91.

alienation,—in cases where one finds himself unconverted or otherwise unfit for communion,—and, in fact, whenever for any uncongeniality of nature or habit the parties *consent* in this way to separate.

Some have pretended in the *abstract* to deny the right of a church thus to relinquish any member without the fullest and severest expulsion. But in *practice* all are glad to avail themselves of some such steps whenever a difficult case arises to call for it. Let it then be fairly recognized as a regular mode of procedure *in its proper place*, rather than, with the denial of the principle, to allow the practice as an irregular thing connived at by stealth. The distinction before us is certainly recognized and allowed by the New Testament. For there the church is told, not only “deliver one to Satan,” (1 Cor. 5: 5,) but from another “withdraw yourselves.” (2 Thess. 3: 6.)*

2. CONCEDED OFFENCES. These are already before the church, being confessed or committed in its presence, or brought to light by its very principles and procedures. They therefore require no trial and no previous steps before being recognized as offences; but the church labor proper commences at once, in accordance with the second great rule of discipline. (2 Thess. 3: 6, 14, 15.) “If any man obey not, * * * * note that man, and have no company with him.” “Withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly.”

Thus, for instance, if under the force of such a home-thrust as that given to Annanias and Sapphira, a member owns to some trespass committed, the case will be at once acted upon without a trial or its preliminaries; or, if one is guilty of an open contempt before the church, he will be summarily dealt with; or, if in meeting he makes charges irregularly against a member, having taken no previous steps, he will be stopped and

* So teaches Punchard, in his “View of Congregationalism,” Appendix. Dexter says, “There is little, if any, difference between the two methods of cutting off a member in their practical results; and if it would make it easier for any church to discharge its painful duty by calling the act of excision by the milder name, there can be no objection to its doing so.” (*Dexter on Cong.*, p. 194.) So Cotton Mather, on the “greater and the lesser excom.”

condemned upon the spot. Thus Paul in public with Peter, "before them all," withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed. (See also 1 Tim. 5 : 20.)

Or again, suppose a member takes himself entirely away from the church, giving no account of himself whatever for two years' time; the church may cross his name from its roll of active members, and may consider him as self-suspended from all church privileges until he shall give satisfactory account of himself,—and this without necessity for trial or previous steps,—*provided*, that the church had from the beginning an agreement to that effect, to which he as well as the rest assented. For he himself *conceded beforehand* that his present procedure is an offence to be treated in just this way; and therefore it needs no previous labor.*

Nothing can rightly be treated as thus a conceded offence to be summarily disposed of, unless (1) it be committed in presence of the church, or (2) it be distinctly confessed, or (3) it were previously agreed upon in church compact as just such an offence. Any Congregational church, in its sovereignty as responsible to Christ alone, may covenant together upon any such organic points as conceded forfeitures of privilege. Only it will be careful not to go beyond a sound New Testament view of duty, of which there is little danger in the prevalent repugnance to everything irksome. When thus pledged, no one can complain of the result, and those who shrink from the ordeal, need not enter into the compact. The necessity of having *some* such previously conceded forfeitures, all will confess, who have noticed the great disorders and irregularities that have accumulated where no such adjustment is provided.

It is a happy omen that so many churches now are more or less supplying this deficiency in their regulations. Let every church thus agree beforehand what are the great organic delinquencies, and what is that persistence in them which will require

* Such *suspended* members are often wrongly regarded as if no members at all; whereas, they are still bound by their covenant, and may be further dealt with at any time; nor can they properly unite elsewhere till they have set themselves right.

official notice and report, and will expose a member to such summary attention. These will include only evident matters, open breaches of covenant duty, seen or known by all as brought out in ordinary carefully kept clerk's or steward's reports,—such as habitual neglect of the church in its meetings, continued indebtedness and non-payment of church dues, with persistent failure to account for oneself or one's doings.

When a member thus by delinquency commits a previously conceded offence, the official report of the fact in the regular course of church procedure, with the church's adoption of that report, consummates his state of *self-suspension*; even as a verdict of guilty ending the trial of an alleged offence consummates the *suspension* of the offender for the time being. In either case the individual is by suspension put upon the defensive, with the "burden of proof" thrown upon him. For it is now decided that he must do something by way of explanation or acknowledgment or endurance of penalty, in order to his continued good standing; and until that is done, if it be but half an hour, his position is surely one of *suspense*.

In this state of suspension comes in the *labor of the church* for the individual's recovery; which may be by private visitation, by committee admonition, or otherwise. And, except in cases where the person cannot be got at, or for other justifiable reason the labor is omitted, either a return or an excommunication must be the final result. But in these cases of *conceded offences*, especially of mere delinquency, it will be the lesser excommunication usually employed.

Instead of the necessary distinction we have now made between *alleged* and *conceded* offences, the older writers were accustomed to distinguish between *private* and *public* offences. When thus made the distinction was objectionable, as Dexter, Pond and other writers have said; for the mere publicity of an alleged offence forms generally no reasonable ground for denying to the alleged offender the explanatory or reformatory advantages of private labor before discipline. And, as Dexter well says: "Nothing can be lost, while much may be gained,

by adhering rigorously *in all cases* to the rule, that the church will not entertain a complaint [of alleged offence] against one of its members, except in the regular way, [of Matt. 18th,] and on assurance that the private steps have been rightly taken." But the distinction as we here make it, between *alleged* and *conceded* offences, and the differing treatment of them, is not only freed from objections, but is found indispensable.

THE DISTINCTION DEFENDED.

We have shown that an *alleged complaint* can be rightly entered with a church only after private steps, and can be adjudged by the church only after full trial; whereas, a *conceded church delinquency* is already before the church, and may be asserted as such by mere official report and acceptance. From this point, when the fact is adjudged by the church, the process of *church labor* proceeds the same in both cases, whether of *alleged* or *conceded* offence.

There are those who deny all distinction,—those who will say a church has no right thus to assert a member delinquent, or to demand from him explanations, or to treat him as meanwhile in suspension, in any case whatever, until there has been full trial, or at least *previous* steps of labor (as well as the labor that comes after.) These certainly have a system either better or worse than Congregationalism. They surely do not follow the great standards of our denomination from the Cambridge Platform downwards.* But let a few things be said in vindication of this Puritan plan of more summary discipline.

* Camb. Plat., Ch. XIV., sect. 2. "If an offence be private [*rather* be only alleged,] the brother offended is to go," &c. Sect. 3. "But if the offence be more public [*rather* be conceded,] at first, * * * then THE CHURCH, *without such gradual* proceeding, is to cast out the offender from their holy communion, for the further mortifying of his sin and the healing of his soul in the day of the Lord Jesus." So argues Lechford, John Robinson, Thomas Goodwin, John Cotton, Mitchell, Samuel Mather, Hooker and others.

Congregational Dictionary, Art. Discipline. "Where the offence is public, [*rather* conceded,] most Congregational writers argue that there is no need of the private steps. * * * As a faithful lexicographer, I am constrained to admit that most Congregational writers thus argue." Those who seem to differ, only stumble at the term *public*.

Even Dexter, after disposing of both private and public offences, says there is still another sort of offence, namely, delinquencies, &c., but he fails to tell us how to treat them. And Dr. Dwight concedes that the private steps are *not always necessary*. So also Dr. Pond, in his work on "The Church," p. 90.

1. It is *scriptural*. In discipline, not only have we a rule of Christ, *addressed to the individual* for the removal of his grievances, but we have also another gospel rule, *addressed directly to the church*, for the maintaining of its purity. This is in 2 Thess. 3: 6, 14, 15, (as well as elsewhere.) Here it is *delinquencies* principally provided for, instead of active trespasses, "if any man obeys not." Such delinquents are at once to be "noted,"—that is the word; this noting will, of course, be led off by the officers appointed for the purpose, they notifying or reminding the church, i. e. reporting the delinquent case. Upon such *noting* and notifying, the person is to be treated as suspended; "note that man, and have *no company with him*, that he may be ashamed." Yet he is not excommunicated, (only suspended;) for the church is still to labor kindly with him for his return to duty; "yet count him not as an enemy, but *admonish him as a brother*." If this is not calling a member to account as in suspension, before the act of excommunication, or even of labor, pray what is it?

And is not this consistent with the other rule in Matthew 18th? Here in Thessalonians we are told how the *church itself* is to discipline when it is not obeyed; but there in Matthew we are told how any and every individual may and should bring the church up to duty and to discipline by steps of his own.

2. This more summary church discipline is *reasonable*. There are cases when private steps are impracticable before church action; as, when a member leaves town, and is entirely lost sight of; or when a member does wrong in meeting, or commits a contempt in the very face of the church. How could the church (or any other body) maintain its own simplest requirements, or even its rules of order, without some power to notice and punish infractions upon the spot? How can it keep out *irregular complaints*, for instance, without the right to note such irregularity at the moment when it is attempted. It is the denial to the church (by some) of the right of summary self-defence, which has plunged many of our churches into such a sea of disorders without any privilege of recovering themselves.

But then, it may be said, the idea of conviction and suspension before trial or labor, is monstrous ! Our reply is : the person is in this case *self*-convicted and *self*-suspended ; and the church in its decision or its acceptance of a report to this effect, only recognizes the fact as *preparatory to labor*. This first noting by the church is not so much discipline as a needful preliminary, showing that discipline is required.* No previous trial is requisite in the case before us, because the fact of open unexplained delinquency is an evident one, which any one present could contradict if not true. No previous labor is requisite, because the member concerned has agreed with the rest beforehand that such a fact of contempt or of delinquency for so long a time unexplained, shall be thus treated in a summary way. No possible wrong can thus be done to any member, because the delinquent must at once be notified, and has it in his power forthwith to set himself right.

The principle is, that in case of any possible question as to the fact of offence, there must be trial and opportunity for defence before the church can rightly recognize offence ; but mark, that when there is a continuous failure, both of church requirement and of explanation, contrary to explicit agreement, then there *can be no possible question* of its being delinquency, which the church (as a body) not only may, but must know and note, and put away.

3. This mode of discipline is *necessary*, nay, indispensable to the good order of the churches. The neglect of it in many, is what is making the sad havoc, which most of us and most of the churches themselves unavailingly deplore. We set going a machine, a Congregational church, independent and without external control, yet deny it the use of any self-regulating power. Individual members, indeed, *can* commence discipline ;

* There may thus be suspension without special censure ; for what is the state of that person who has a letter to another church which he has not used, but a partial state of temporary self-suspension ? Surely he has no right to vote in either church till the letter is delivered up. And, in a case of scandalous rumor, suspension may be voted at once, pending an investigation.

but then, what is everybody's business is nobody's; and consequently none but the most *personal* and the most *heinous* crimes ever get attended to. Thus the church soon becomes irregular and corrupt, while neither the officers nor even the whole church as such is allowed to bring anybody to account. There is nothing permitted but a tedious individual process, which in their disordered state is impracticable. Thus the great doctrine of the *individual's accountability to the church* is completely ignored; and instead of each member being made responsible to keep up his own standing, the church becomes a grand insurance corporation, to warrant and defend the perpetual good standing of all once connected with it.

Herein appears the beauty and value and necessity of discipline for *conceded* as distinguished from *alleged* offences, whereby an evident delinquent is (by his own previous agreement) put at once upon the defensive, like a convicted offender, and made to right his own case, or suffer the consequence. Upon each member is thrown the burden of maintaining his own position in the church, by either rendering service or offering explanation. And from the church is thus lifted an intolerable load, which she never did and never can bear, and under which she is in many cases being crushed and destroyed.

What potency and success is given to a sister denomination by its quiet disposal of delinquents! whereby *all* such may be cut off from their evil influence, yet without offence to any, and with speedy re-union of most. Shall not a little common sense bring *us* a like success? So long as we require every such case of delinquency to wait (like crime) for the slow and formidable process of individual discipline, so long shall we find individuals shirking the irksome duty, and delinquency thus going unrebuked, to the discomfiture of the church,—or else, when occasional discipline is tried, its offensive form will continue (as heretofore) to drive the offenders from us, and even from our services and our good influences forever away. The distinction here made, between *alleged* and *conceded* offences, is a sovereign remedy for evils of this sort.

ARTICLE V.

FREE THOUGHT IN GEOGRAPHY.

REPORTED BY A DREAMER.

OUR Modern Athens has been served of late most bountifully with the very strongest meat of modern progress. Every seven days a fresh gospel has been promulgated. An opinion over a week old is hardly respectable.

One day, having treated myself, to the full, with liberal doctrines, I fell asleep, and in my sleep I dreamed.

It was Horticultural Hall, and there were convened our latter-day saints, sages and reformers; and the subject in agitation was the old system of geography. It was regarded as imperative to apply the principles and methods of the liberal school to this important department of science. The *characters* were there—the old and the young war-horses of radicalism. The prevailing air of the assembly was cool, saucy and audacious as when something is to be said and done calculated to produce a sensation. The true liberal reverences nothing human, and sees nothing in God to be afraid of. But I am reporting a dream.

A man of theories, not of prosaic erudition, was called to the chair, and a bold speculator opened in the following vein:

“Mr. Chairman: We come to-day to apply the grand principles of our glorious *Progress* to the old science of geography. I will put one of these principles, which concerns our action at the outset, in the form of a motion, as follows: *Resolved*, That individual opinion be recognized as supreme authority.”

Professor Scientist promptly replied: “Mr. Moderator, I object to such a resolve as utterly preposterous. Geography is a structure of facts which”—

An impatient Progressive interrupting:—

“That is an exploded notion. We have a more excellent way. Individual opinion is the magic influence by which the wonders of our time are wrought. By that sign we conquer.”

Professor Scientist. "What has the individual to do but to discover, and state the facts as they are? Can our opinions annihilate the Alps or lay out a continent?"

Progressive. "We do greater works than those with them. I demand the question."

The motion was carried with a will, as if its significance and design were fully appreciated.

Chairman. "The spirit of this resolve greatly simplifies our action. Every man, woman, or child even, can dash into the work at once, for no research through ponderous volumes, no vast erudition, no results of exploration or observation are called for, but only that which is most easy for every one, namely, the presentation of opinions. I think I am authorized in saying that one man's or woman's thoughts, here, are as good as another's; and that any of our ideas are more weighty than any so-called fact, upon which, till our day, so much stress has been laid. Comment freely, therefore, upon this old system which so much needs your sifting."

Rev. Dr. Broadchurch. "Mr. Moderator: I trust our over-literal friend will not be disturbed by the principle we have adopted. While I voted for it, and deem it an essential resort, I design, by no means, to subject *all* facts to opinions. I am a friend to our venerable geographical system. I believe in it as a whole; but it has some disagreeable features which should be modified by the human judgment."

Professor Scientist. "Does not the Reverend gentleman consider that he has introduced a principle utterly destructive of all truth as well as all science? Whatever his personal intentions may be, he has voted for that which renders any system of geography an impossibility."

Dr. Broadchurch. "It need not be applied to such an extent. I keep the golden mean and avoid all extremes."

Young America. "Stick to the text of opinion, old fellow. That makes kings of us all, boys as well as the rest. I don't care so much about the old geography, but the idea of the almightiness of one's opinions is a precious handy one for us

larks. On this line we are as good as the governor, and we get ahead of those solemn old saws put in the way of our fun. A jolly good time we youngsters will have for cutting up among these gle-orious new principles."

This young man rattled off his enthusiasm, and subsided before the startled and scandalized convention could catch sufficient breath to call him to order.

Dr. Broadchurch. "Mr. Chairman: I rise but this once more, to express my brief exception to the present geographical representations. I do not believe in the absurd stuff about the torrid zone. There cannot be such a *hot* place."

A mild-mannered man remarked, that he, too, believed in the universal satisfaction theory rather than the commonly received hard-featured system.

A Young Convert here relates his experience: "I am young in years, but not in opinions. Witness before you a brand plucked from the burning, a soul disenthralled from that dismal and superstitious science of the world which you here to-day denounce and doom. I was born in the bosom of this dark geographical school, and instructed in every particular of its awful representations. But its teachings were ever hateful to me. It was a peculiarity of mine to be particularly arrested by the lines of latitude and longitude upon the maps. But it early occurred to my mind that I never saw those lines on the earth. Here, thought I, is a test. I will prove the thing. Day after day I walked about in profoundest search for those lines. In my deep and solemn purpose I traversed the seas. I watched by day and by night, in sunshine and storm; again I passed and repassed where the equator and tropics were marked. I made all inquiry, but never a line, sir, of latitude or longitude, or any such thing did I see. I had been deceived. Then did I solemnly renounce this whole system in which I was born." (Applause.)

Professor Scientist. "*Imaginary* lines, my young friend."

Young Convert. "*Imaginary* lines? Do we not see them everywhere on the maps? Ah, sir, I know your sophistries.

How desperately you strive to evade the point. My words cannot be denied. The charts are covered with lines like to which there is nothing on the face of the earth. (Applause.) But (in most solemn and impressive manner) I retort upon the gentleman and his science, the full force of that word; those lines and all else of this hideous system are indeed *imaginary*, and only imaginary. That dark despotism holds no longer. The young blood of the nineteenth century heads this crusade of freedom." (Thunders of applause.)

An high priestess here prophesies:—

"Mr. Moderator: I beg the indulgence of this enlightened audience while I briefly state the results of much thought upon the subject under consideration. How unsubstantial is this time-honored system! How little of it can stand the tests of modern thought! Sadly, perhaps, we, in the forefront of our glorious progress, have seen one portion after another of that once imposing structure fall to the ground. Its stern and uncompromising spirit was not consistent with freedom of opinion. I have long since ceased to have any faith in the continents, islands, oceans, &c., and all thereunto pertaining as represented in the standard works of geography. The world is not described such as a decent and reasonable world ought to be. But what is to be the geography of the future? Not, indeed, as some would say, an entirely new system. The old has done grand service in the past, and it needs but modification, purification and elevation for the time to come. Some may ask what remains after the exceptions I have taken. That may be a difficult question to answer, but I record myself, notwithstanding, as a champion of this ancient and beneficent system, yet always as subject to my opinions."

Famous Philosopher. "Mr. Moderator, and ladies and gentlemen: There is a fixedness in all sciences, and particularly in this, which is not to my liking. It is well-known that I hold *inconsistency* to be an essential condition of the most perfect truthfulness. But how can we exhibit that changeableness so vital to all order if we are chained to certitude? A geography,

to be in the highest degree reliable, should not have a fact in it. *Ideas* based on the sure foundations of the individual consciousness only should command our respect. The time has not yet come for the perfect and universal science of the earth. That day will come, not as some strangely suppose, when discovery and observation have been pushed to their utmost in the material world, but when perfected intercommunication shall have disclosed the *ideas* of the whole human race; especially those pure and original ones, least corrupted by intelligence and education. Wait for the discovery of this untold wealth of barbarism. Divinest free-thinking is impossible to us because of our knowledge. I look for a pure geography from the Hottentot, or some still more uncultivated savage who never had a fact in his head. This course of thought, you observe, illustrates the position I took, years ago, that civilization is greatly inferior to barbarism. Let the old geography be discarded, while we wait in hope for the new."

Hon. Serene Sincerity. "Mr. Moderator: The time has evidently come for making prominent another of our principles—a favorite one with me. We are many men of many minds. A harmonizer is needed. We have it in one of our glorious doctrines, this: *It matters not what a man believes if he is only sincere.* Now, as related to our fellow men, we are very toleration itself, except to those narrow and superstitious people who will stubbornly persist in believing old notions. But it is not towards our fellow men that we would set the application of the doctrine of sincerity, but towards this earth. What is geography? What facts make it? No, sir. What other people think it to be? No, sir; not necessarily. But what? This: just what you or I may please to think it is, in our free and divine sincerity. This sincerity within us is something irresistibly potent. It bears the fiat of divinity. To it all things bow. This clear-eyed, unfaltering trust and expectancy, what is there in earth or heaven that shall venture it contradiction? The very thought of such a thing is dreadful. We will not indulge it for a moment. This world is the most flexible and plastic of

all things ; it always adapts itself to our notions. I know this doctrine to be very extensively adopted in respect to other most important matters, and I hold it equally wise, pertinent and useful as applied to physical geography. Are we, my friends, to suppose, for a moment, that unbelievers in earthquakes could ever be destroyed by them ? If one believes Greenland to be a paradise, and walks consistently by that faith, can he be disappointed ? If any sincere person should believe the arctic regions best adapted to fruit culture, would any hard, cold, inexorable geographical condition do violence to his plans ? Sir, I have no patience with books, or people that populate this beautiful earth with such a multitude of cruel, fateful facts, so that all our ideas of life must be continual watching, care and dodging about to save ourselves from harm or destruction. Let us be zealous to spread our blessed doctrines among the fearful and deluded people of the earth."

Sea Captain. "Make that thing work, my friend, and it will be a big thing in my line. I have been dodging about among facts all my life, and a pretty tough time I have had of it, too. I have been so simple as to suppose if I should be sincerely mistaken and thus run into the breakers, I should be done for entirely. Just make it as safe to run down a fact with a ship as with talk, and we will have an easier time on the seas."

Railroad Man. "If that doctrine can be applied to the earth, the expenses of railroad building will be considerably reduced. I would like the patent of a machine that would remove mountains with opinions."

Speculator. "Give me the sincerity quirk, Mister, and I will make my pile on old Sahara."

Farmer. "I should like to try this sincerity on my hard-scrabble patch."

Prof. Scientist, who had thus far listened with mingled astonishment and derision at the course of remarks, now abruptly exclaimed :

"Mr. Moderator : Am I in a mad house ? In the face of one of the noblest of sciences, in the clear light of realities and

common sense, are these sane people that can perpetrate such absurd stuff as this? What can all the opinions of the world avail against a single fact that the hand of Almighty God has fixed? In the name of science and sense"—

An excited individual sprang to his feet and shouted:

"Mr. Chairman: I should like to know what good believing does. How much better is a man for it? Those who go against this old geography seem to me just as noble and good as this old stickler himself. This believing is humbug."

Prof. Scientist. "I tell you, my friend, it is a good thing to look out for the truth. Better instruct your children about poisons though you may perish by them. Keep the charts according to the reality, though *you* may die among the breakers. In this grave and vital science let men beware how they cover truth or inculcate error, for destruction and misery untold is the result of that wicked misleading. You—"

Mr. Liberal, (interrupting.) "Mr. Moderator: I rejoice that I am no narrow-minded, intolerant bigot. I go for free speech. I care not what hard and savage assaults are made upon this or any other old system. But, sir, I am *not* liberal enough to suffer a man to speak in favor of old dogmas. This matter-of-fact fellow, with his musty notions, has been tolerated beyond reason. Therefore, I move that not another word of unqualified advocacy of the old geography be allowed by this liberal body." Carried, with a will.

The gentlemen rebuked withdrew as from a crowd of lunatics. This excitement subsiding, a brilliant M. D., who largely attracts public attention, arose and addressed the convention with much feeling.

"Mr. Chairman: I do not think sufficient stress of reprobation has been put upon the savage and cruel features of this traditional superstition. In the name of humanity, and of God, I cry out against those offensive representations with which the standard text-books of this hoary mass of tradition abound. Here are hideous and poisonous reptiles, which we are to believe inhabit this fine earth; creatures altogether pernicious, whose

very existence would be a reflection upon the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. Here the feelings of our children are harrowed by the picture of a monstrous serpent crushing in his horrid folds a living horse and his rider, preparing them as a delicious morsel for his detestable maw. That is one of the essential facts we are all expected to swallow. Again, I call your attention to a company of men and women hilarious over a feast of fattened children! These, sir, are but a sample of the shocking monstrosities by which our moral sense and nervous system are assailed. What views of God, their Creator, will our children come to cherish with these wicked misrepresentations of his works before their eyes? I see, sir, in the old geography the hideous *sacrificial system*. As these books state it, death, sir, moulders at the root of all life. Creatures innumerable are continually devouring each other. What a view of savagery and destruction! I affirm that such a philosophy of the world is an outrage upon a civilized and benevolent age, and a desecration of the holiness of God. We must be rid of this barbarism. We want a geography, sir, treating only of the lovely, beautiful and desirable, and thus calculated to inspire love to God, and love for the world. Let us have a sweet and heavenly science. For myself, as long as I can brandish a pen, I shall not cease to make the most desperate thrusts in my power at this hateful beast, though his hide is tougher than any alligator's."

Chairman. "The spirit of the convention has perhaps been sufficiently negative and destructive. I would suggest that something be proposed of a constructive and positive nature, in which we are agreed.

Liberal. "Does the Moderator suggest a strait-jacket?"

Moderator. "By no means; but a certain something expressing our common opinion."

Liberal. "If we signify our assent to anything in a positive and constructive way, do we not limit freedom of thought?"

I observed a spirit of uncertainty and confusion to manifest itself in the convention. The old king being deposed, the log-

ical suggestion was that a new one should be crowned, but a step in that direction would split the assembly into a hundred hostile factions. Noisy and tumultuous antagonisms appeared, and the once harmonious convention seemed about to burst asunder in wild and angry confusion, when, in the midst of the uproar, there was heard a voice demanding a hearing. At length every eye was arrested by a form like the very personification of radicalism; separated in appearance by the very finest line from some of those illuminated creatures whose misfortune it is, so often, to be consigned to the mad-house. In exalted attitude, and with strange, thrilling tone, he cried:

"Friends, ye began well, but why pause in mid course and build again that which you destroyed? Your conquests in the realm of free thought are but begun. I point you to the logical goal of your glorious race. Hesitation is mutual destruction. Unity is onward. Are you ready for the grand effort? Geography? There is need of none. See ye? *There is no world; the earth is a myth.*"

Suppressed breath, beating hearts, "eyes in fine frenzy rolling," and then one wild, universal shout, "*There is no world; the earth is a myth!*" In tumultuous enthusiasm the assembly broke up to bear the glad and sublime tidings—whither?

But as the jubilant crowd was dispersing a mysterious and awful voice echoed thunder-like from the skies, its unearthly spell arrested every soul. "Puny, arrogant, infatuated mortals, it is on the God of the earth you war. Him in his word and works ye hate. Who are ye to say what is or ought to be, regardless of what Almighty God has said and done? Even the outraged moral and common sense of the race shall spew all your baseless and pernicious theories into the perdition of oblivion. And he that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh." With a thrill of horror my slumbers broke, and my dream ended.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Congregational History, 1200-1567. By JOHN WADDINGTON, D. D. London: John Snow & Co. 1868. pp. 748.

The most important book for Congregationalists published in England for many years. We announced it as forthcoming in the "Congregational Review" for July, 1868. The "volume of five hundred pages," however, which we anticipated, has swelled to two hundred and fifty more. None of them could be spared. The London "Literary World" says of Dr. Waddington's work:—

"The results of immense research, carried on through many years of quiet, unobserved, uncheered, but unwearied labor, in obscure and out-of-the-way quarters, some of them such as hardly any foot of man had trod before, and well-nigh as much a *terra incognita* as were to us the more central parts of Africa and the source of the Nile till these were opened to us by Livingstone and Baker and Speke. The work abounds in rare and original documents, some of them of the greatest interest and value, which give to it often an antique and picturesque character, and a weight of authority very unusual in these days of superficial and slipshod retailing of materials lying nearest to hand. These are put together with great skill, in a light and pleasant manner, with brevity, with continual change and relief, and in a style of singular purity, perspicacity and beauty. The mere general reader will find it no unreadable or unattractive book, while for all earnest students it is one of unspeakable value. And at the present time, when ecclesiastical questions are awakening such deep and wide-spread interest, and engaging everywhere so much attention,—when there is such a desire for information and comparative readiness to receive it without prejudice, the appearance of Dr. Waddington's book is for all the parties and interests concerned a most seasonable and happy event. And Congregationalists at least should exert themselves to promote its circulation and study to the utmost both among themselves and others."

The literary critic is sufficiently astonished to find the principles of our Pilgrim fathers acting on church history five hundred years ago. The impression is in some quarters that Congregationalism is a thing of the past two centuries only. Dr. Waddington's labors ought to put that ignorant presumption to flight forever. As to our germinal and formative principles, we have antiquity enough with us. Sometimes one development of Congregationalism, sometimes another has appeared in history. Now one of the greater

principles, now one of the lesser. The thing has never been entirely dead. As President Hopkins says of Christianity, in his "Evidences," it has always been in the world, so we say of this, it has always been in the church, and in the real Christian life. The "Literary World" closes a long notice by saying:—

"One thing is very clear from this volume,—Congregationalists have grand and noble ancestry in history. They stand in the line of a long unbroken succession of the truest and noblest heroes extending through many centuries, and bear a banner which has been borne by successive generations of saints, confessors, martyrs, without interruption through many ages, which is surrounded with examples and traditions of suffering, of endurance, of fidelity, and of moral triumph, with which nothing in modern history can compare—a banner which deserves and demands to be lifted high by them before all nations and men, and maintained with courage, fidelity and zeal, and carried forward in triumph through the world; and Dr. Waddington has done a great service for them and for society in general, for the truth itself and all the interests associated with it, by the preparation and publication, especially at such a time as this, of this important work. May Congregationalists themselves appreciate the service, and earnestly peruse and circulate the book. It should be found without delay on the shelves of all their ministers, in the libraries at all the Colleges and congregations, and in reading societies, and adopted as a text-book for instruction in Church history of the younger members of churches both in lectures and in classes."

When the industrious and patient explorer of the past put upon his title-page "Congregationalism, 1200—", he by no means undertook to show that there was then an organized denomination and a developed system. He simply pointed out the fact that at that early day certain principles peculiar and essential to Congregationalism were held and defended. His object was to show that in the darkest hours began "the gradual restoration of the church as a divine institution to its primitive purity and simplicity." "Light gleams forth at intervals in the most unexpected manner, and Christian people drawn together by the force of kindred affection are found meeting together for mutual instruction and united worship, apart from the parochial congregations of the United Church." Of such believers, when testifying for and exemplifying Congregational principles inorganically, the "New Englander" says with great truth: "The history of such witnesses and of their testimony, as well as of communities separated from the Roman unity and professing to obey Christ rather than Christ's pretended vicar,—communities like the Waldenses, the English Lollards and the followers

of Huss—is Congregational history.” One of the English Nonconformist journals makes the criticism that the book would have been more perfect if the author “had entered less into the general history of the Church, or even of the various parties who tried to bring about a reform.” The opinion of the “New Englander” seems to us the better opinion. The connections of Congregationalism with general Christian history are of the greatest importance. The convictions in accordance with our established and developed principles which struggled to express themselves in former ages and were despotically and often cruelly prevented are of the highest interest to us. We thank the author of the “Hidden Church” and of the “Life of Penry” and of the “Surrey Congregational History,” for this part of his new and noble work.

Having sketched the course of Dr. Waddington’s investigations in advance last year, we only add that the present admirable volume is only the precursor of others, treating of subsequent Congregational history in times of which we know more, but in respect to which Dr. Waddington has rich unused materials. He hopes to get a second volume to press within a year. It will be of even greater interest than the one just issued. “I propose to look at things internationally,” he says, in a private note to us, “and to plough more deeply than those who have preceded me in this field.” It will be a loss to our literature if want of appreciation of what he has already so well done should discourage the author from going forward. Our readers will do Congregationalism a favor, and an act of justice as well, by sending to Scribner, New York, for this volume. It may ere long be out of print and of priceless value, as a second edition is not probable.

Studies in Philosophy and Theology. By JOSEPH HAVEN, D. D., Chicago Theological Seminary. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1869. pp. 502.

Seven of the essays in this interesting volume are reprinted from the “*Bibliotheca Sacra*,” one—that on the Trinity—from the “*New Englander*,” one from the “*Proceedings of the Triennial Convention at Chicago*,” being the address at the author’s inauguration as Theological Professor, and two have never appeared in print before—the Porter Rhetoric Society Address on the Ideal and the Actual, and the paper on Arianism read before the Chicago Alumni Institute. Professor Haven’s superior lucidity of statement and rare simplicity of thought appear in them all. No intelligent reader can be in doubt for a moment about his meaning. A beautiful ease

and naturalness of style—sufficiently uncommon in abstract discussions—leads the mind on from page to page. The author is always interesting and clear; his candor and painstaking in fairly stating the truth appear everywhere; and a reader can easily infer the excellences that mark his work as a theological instructor.

In his Notes to the articles on the Moral Faculty and in a "Note Supplementary," Professor Haven discusses the notion that right and wrong are not ultimate distinctions, but founded on something back of themselves, especially as recently affirmed by President Hopkins. A great deal of acute discrimination and cogent reasoning is packed into a very few pages. When the author treats the conformity of a right act with the end of one's being (which Dr. Hopkins affirms to be the reason why it is right,) as a quality of the act, however, though it furnishes a sufficient reply to Dr. Hopkins, it is not all that is true. Conformity to the end of one's being is a *relation* between a right act and another object of thought, and Dr. Hopkins' theory founds right in a relation. Moreover, in ten thousand right acts it is an unperceived relation, which is a *slight* difficulty in the way of considering it as the ground of their being right. Multitudes of our moral acts are so insignificant (comparatively) that we have no reference in performing them to any generalization like the end of our being, and even if that be the reason of their rightness, *it is to us of necessity, just as if it were not*. Professor Haven, in his own way, sufficiently discloses—as others have done—the weak spot in Dr. Hopkins' book.

The Ideal is very happily treated in one of these (unpublished) papers. We do not know how Dr. Haven reconciles what is said with the position taken in his Mental Philosophy that the "Imagination is limited to Sensible Objects." Professor Porter, in his "Human Intellect," seems to us to hold the profounder and sounder opinion.

Dr. McCosh's Works, (Uniform Edition.) New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

A noble monument to their brother Scot his excellent American publishers have erected in these solid and handsome volumes. They are four,—the work on the Natural and the Supernatural not being included. What grand subjects of philosophical theology the Nassau Hall President has treated in them, treated too with unwonted freshness, simplicity, cogency and instructiveness. Two of them—the Intuitions of the Mind, and the Examination of Mill—are occupied with the intellectual groundwork of philosophy and

theology alike, and well is the field explored, and most lucidly are the results stated. Here and there we should demur to a point made or an argument stated,—the author does not so rigidly use his terms as a metaphysical education in New England would have taught him to do; but when one has done so well, it is a little ungracious to complain that he has not done better. In the “Typical Forms” the doctrine of God as Creator receives a handsome and valuable contribution. Both in breadth and depth the book is a notable one. In the “Divine Government, Physical and Moral,”—first issued, but in the order of thought last,—God’s administration is explored with great fulness, clearness and grasp of thought. Four such works any Christian writer might be proud to have contributed to the philosophy of mind and of religion.

A Review of the “Vie de Jesus” of M. Renan. By Rev. J. B. PATON, M. A. London: H. J. Tresidder. pp. 160.

The accomplished and useful writer of this timely book should be better known this side the ocean than he is. His position as “Principal” of the Congregational Institute at Nottingham, England, in some respects resembles that of the new Smith Professor at Andover. The number of Congregational candidates for such a Special Course for the ministry steadily and largely increases in that country. But the Principal’s pen is not idle. Besides articles in effective review of such writers as Renan,—the contents of the present volume having appeared in that form in the “London Quarterly Review”—he is understood to have an important work on the Atonement forthcoming.

Perhaps if Mr. Paton had not written in the first flush of M. Renan’s influence, he would not have rated his pestilent book so highly as he does. He says, “It is undoubtedly the worthiest and greatest work of a purely infidel cast which has been written this century.” He speaks of the “consummate art, delicate poesy, sentiment and thorough scholarship” which characterize this and other productions of the author, and have “placed him in the first rank of living writers.” A brief lapse of time has effected a large discount on this estimate. Professor Stowe, writing later, says of the “Vie de Jesus,” “It is lively and popular in style, but pre-eminently superficial and untrustworthy.” He quotes Dr. Phillipson, a Jewish Rabbi, nowise friendly to the gospels, whose “solid Teutonic erudition is repelled and disgusted by the flippant shallowness of the Frenchman.” “For our subject he is of no value. Renan is no critic; he is merely a rationalist,” says the Jewish critic.

Mr. Paton opens with an account of Hegelianism and the Positive Philosophy and their alliance in M. Renan against Christianity. He then sketches the contents and course of the "*Vie de Jesus*;" discusses the infidel maxim, "there can be no miracle;" examines Renan's principle that Monotheism is a native growth of the Semitic mind; criticizes his fabulous account of the origin of the gospels, and proves that his book is not deducible from the documents, inconsistent and full of impossibilities, bad in its morals, and a failure as an account of the rise of Christianity. A skilful and facile pen handles all these topics in an interesting and satisfactory manner. M. Renan is a positiveist and a pantheist, and has been a Catholic,—a believer once, a believer no more. A sad and disappointed tone breathes through his writings. Possessed with a passion for the history of religions, he has undertaken to show that the spiritual monotheism of Christianity is "a Semitic dogma which Jesus loosened from its root-hold and winged for universal acceptance; that the legendary stories, as he calls the miraculous narratives, are the deposit of a later age, the offspring of credulous and fervid imaginations;" and that these being rejected we can piece together something like a true history of Jesus. Mr. Paton predicts that the revulsion against Renan's attempt will be sterner and more indignant than arose against that of Strauss. Well as the French writer has been refuted by others, it has never been better done than in Mr. Paton's Review. The critique is minutely amplified in parts where that was necessary, and solidly condensed in others. The peculiar principles of Christian morality which M. Renan fails to account for are thus well summarized in the conclusion: "1. The law of sacrifice, or of spontaneous and self-denying love. 2. The dignity and worth of human nature. 3. The equality of all men as children of one father and heirs of a common salvation. 4. The chivalrous respect for woman—her equal spiritual prerogative. 5. The sacredness of truth, and confession of it. 6. The control of principle over passion. 7. Supreme devotion to Christ. 8. The duty and grace of forgiveness. 9. The honor of humility. 10. The certainty of an everlasting judgment."

Lamps, Pitchers and Trumpets. By EDWIN PAXTON HOOD, minister of Queen-Square Chapel. Author of "*Wordsworth*," and "*Dark Sayings on a Harp*." New York: M. W. Dodd. Boston: For sale by M. H. Sargent. 1869. pp. 450. \$1.75.

This is a very interesting volume, illustrated by anecdotes, biographical, historical and elucidatory, of every order of pulpit elo-

quence, from the great preachers of all ages. It is dedicated to Charles H. Spurgeon, in whose Pastor's College most of it was delivered in the form of lectures to students. Preachers who address the intellect, the experience and the conscience, are the Lamps, Pitchers and Trumpets of Gideon.

Gates Ajar. By Miss ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co.

We noticed this book in our January issue; but the enterprising publishers have sent us another volume, desiring, perhaps, that we should be a little more exhaustive.

If Miss Phelps' object was to make a sensation, she has most certainly accomplished it; for the thousands of copies sold, the numerous flattering letters received by the author, the large place it holds in conversation, and the varied criticism bestowed upon her book, prove it. It is a very readable book; racy, bold, piquant, brusque, tender, pathetic, with here and there passages of great beauty and sweet appreciation of nature, in contrast with rough strokes of a dashing pen. Not unfrequently you see the school-girl style of ejecting some expression of impatience and discontent with a jerk of the shoulders and a toss of the head.

The author evidently lives with her eyes and ears wide open spiritward, probably too wide open; for, as the gates of heaven are only "ajar," we feel sure that she has written more than she saw or heard. She describes very powerfully her grief at the loss of Roy, and the insufficiency of nature and man to comfort in its earliest stages; but represents the suggestion that she and Roy will meet again and know each other, as the dawn of an idea as new as it was comforting. But with eyes and ears open earthward, she certainly could not, with her parentage and almost lifelong associations on Andover Hill, be on anything but the most familiar terms with the thought of re-union and companionship in heaven. She must, therefore, be a little unfitted to see either world very clearly.

Aunt Forceythe was a very excellent woman, and says many sensible and comforting things, describing in a beautiful manner the baptism of her little one just before her husband passed away in the twilight of that summer evening; but her reasoning about the presence of our departed friends, and the earthly employments transferred to heaven, and the wedding-ring being removed at death by the departed husband, or its passing through the grave to glory with her, will hardly bear examination.

Faith seems wise beyond her years; childish enough in believing as she had been taught that she would make mud pies in heaven, and eat dinners and ginger-snaps there, and that good boys would have balloons, and balls, and kites to fly up there; but not child-like in quoting from Dr. Bland's sermon with glee, and calling him a "bully old minister," while her mother looked upon this as among the young jokes which, in connection with the "old jokes" of Roy, would be reproduced in heaven. And what a pity it seems that Miss Phelps could not have been acquainted with some good, sensible pastor, for Dr. Bland, it seems to us, did not need to have a child burned to death or lose his wife to indoctrinate him in the belief of human companionships and human joys in the world above. And if the adoration and worship of the Divine One must be the burden of his sermon, it might at least have been intimated that it was because the lesser stars were put out for the time being by the greater sun.

Deacon Quirk (if there really is such a deacon, Barnum should know it without delay,) came doubtless to administer consolation in the hour of grief, and thought, in his simplicity, that God and the arrangements of his all-wise providence would be quite as comforting to a Christian young woman as any talk about a lost lover.

Even Aminadab, with his mechanical genius, might have been supposed likely to find food for thought in the idea of investigating the works of the infinite Inventor and Constructor, in the future life, without anticipating a contract for building a church, or inventing machinery for "histing the pearly gates." But that would not have "brought down the house."

The Sabbath school class must have been somewhat peculiarly taught to associate the thought of standing up and singing among the celestials, with their being constructed of jujube paste; and the girl whose soul was full of music might have revelled in the Bible descriptions of the music of heaven, without expecting to find there for her particular use a rosewood piano from the celebrated manufactory of the Chickering's, or Hallet, Davis & Co.

While we give the talented author credit for the many beautiful things said, and some just criticisms made, we must still maintain that she does not fairly state the average belief of Christians regarding heaven, but takes extreme cases and sets them forth as representative ones. Her theories of the heavenly state seem coarse, secular, material, irreverent and belittling to one familiar with the Bible. In fact, her highest idea of heaven seems to be, to

be with Roy. The Bible teaches heaven by emblems. The pearly gates, the golden streets, the walls of precious stones, the tree of life, the river of life, the harps, the crowns, are understood by every intelligent child to be only images and emblems. What they represent we are not told; but while heaven is a place, and we are to have bodies there, the dominant impression is, that its joys are holy and spiritual.

"Eye hath not seen nor ear heard" what God has prepared above, but "*He hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit*," and we claim that every believer has a revealing of the *kind* of enjoyment of which heaven will consist—something elevated and spiritual, infinitely better than the gross descriptions which this work furnishes. Luther writes a beautiful allegory to his little boy when absent; but when at home, holding him on his knee, he would not have told him he would literally have all he described. Dr. Watts writes, in the vein of poetic sentiment, of "congregations which ne'er break up," and "Sabbaths which never end," and of "sacred, high, eternal noon;" but he did not for a moment believe that heaven was all worship in a vast concourse, an unvarying repetition of Sabbath services, or an exposure to the rays of a tropical sun at noon-day. There will be no danger of sunstroke in a place where the Lamb is the "light thereof," and no fans are needed in heaven to cool the heated brow.

We deeply regret that Miss Phelps has marred her pages by allusions to the resurrection of the skeleton whose first employment is to modestly draw on his skin; to the existence of the disembodied spirit as a turning into gas; and to the meek request of the good boy or girl in heaven to go down and play on some Wednesday or Saturday afternoon in hell! She should have left such as these to Theodore Parker and his followers.

This book will reach hundreds of thousands of readers. A few narrow-minded Christians may be widened and benefited; some may derive comfort from its suggestions; but the many will regret that their exalted views of heaven have been invaded. Multitudes will be grateful who are not Christian believers, who even reject the Bible and believe in stages of progress in the future alike to all, and who would gladly take with them as much of earth as possible. There is so little of God and Christ in the heaven here described, that few will feel unprepared for such a state; and so much of earth and nature, that many who have no taste at all for psalm-singing or worship, may make themselves very comfortable

in the mechanical or agricultural departments of such a heaven; or, if the proximity to God should be too close, and His presence become oppressive, they might hope to spend most of their time *abroad*, travelling from planet to planet, thankful that the gates of heaven are not closed against their exit, but that they are still the "gates ajar."

The Tennessean in Persia and Koordisan. Being Scenes and Incidents in the Life of Samuel Audley Rhea. By Rev. DWIGHT W. MARSH, for ten years Missionary in Mosul. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee. Boston: For sale by The Congregational Sabbath School and Publishing Society. pp. 381. Price, \$1.75.

A well illustrated book, written with great vivacity, and full of missionary incident. The preface well says, "Adventures among robber chiefs in border wars will attract the young. The more thoughtful will ponder the fate of empires and vanity of life, as they follow the track of Xenophon, Alexander and Cyrus, or muse in the hollow tomb of Nineveh. Christians, it is believed, will catch fresh inspiration from a soul so capable of responding to the call, 'Come up higher.'"

Uncle John's Flower Gatherers. A Companion for The Woods and Fields. With illustrations. New York: M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway. Boston: M. H. Sargent, 13 Cornhill.

Philip Brantley's Life Work, and How He Found It. New York: M. W. Dodd. Boston: M. H. Sargent.

These two beautiful volumes, of near 300 pages each, are among the best for children and youth. In the *Flower Gatherers*, Uncle John contrives to give a great deal of instruction about all kinds of flowers, plants and shrubs, in a very attractive way, weaving in beautiful poetry and pretty dialogue. If we could have read such a book in early life, we are sure that the names, habits and beauties of the Hepatica, the Epigæa, the Anemone, Sanguinaria, Caltha, &c., &c., would have been far more familiar and enjoyable. *Philip Brantley's Life Work* is a story of equal interest, but of a still deeper and more thorough religious cast, and seems more like a Sabbath book.

The People's Edition of Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul. Preliminary Dissertation by Dr. LEONARD BACON. Hartford: S. S. Scranton & Co. 1869.

It was a happy thought of the authors of this grand work "for a wider circle of readers." It richly deserves the widest, and none

could prepare it so well as the men who made it. Their work, in this edition,—with the notes translated, as in the original edition,—is beyond all praise. Dr. Bacon's portico to this noble temple is a most fitting one. Few men could have done this particular thing better. And how the authors he introduces make the great apostle live again, with all his surrounding perils, difficulties, fitnesses—in his simple and wonderful nobleness and unselfish purity of character—not statuesque, but like a living, moving, most impressive, most impressive, energetic, effective man! The "People's Edition" has some new notes and better illustrations than the original one; the text is unaltered; the abbreviations have been in things which could be spared from general use, and leave its popular value unimpaired.

A Manual of the Principles, Doctrines, and Usages of Congregational Churches. Compiled by Rev. J. E. Roy. Chicago, 1869. pp. 48.

The West is beginning to show its high and increasing appreciation of Congregationalism. This useful and well-timed pamphlet is one of the indications. The active Home Missionary Agent for Illinois has here brought together (1) A short sketch of Congregational History, (Mo. Manual;) (2) Principles of Polity, (Congregational Board, tract expanded;) (3) National Council Declaration of Faith; (4) Genius of Congregationalism, Dr. E. Beecher; (5) How to form a Church; (6) Constitution; (7) Confession of Faith; (8) Manual for Business Meetings; (9) Letters Missive, &c.; (10) How to incorporate a Church; (11) Advantages of Congregationalism, Dr. E. Pond. The publication is afforded at ten cents, postage paid, and even cheaper in quantities. No intending church organization is excusable now for not knowing how to proceed.

Inauguration of James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., as President of the College of New Jersey. Princeton, October, 1868. Carters. pp. 96.

The Inaugural Address, on Academic Teaching in Europe, is simple, at times quite rude in structure, but marked by very sound sense, and illustrated from a wide acquaintance with institutions in the Old World. There is in it a carelessness about the niceties of English rhetoric which is, perhaps, not surprising in one who has lived and taught so long in Ireland, and a clumsiness of expression which the excess of praise with which Dr. McCosh's advent was hailed by our Presbyterian friends a little surprised us. Still,

the drift of the address is excellent. It advocates as college studies the ancient languages, mathematics, natural science, and mental and social science. It is impartial in judging between competing branches of learning. It deplores the over-multiplication of small and needless colleges, and expresses the judgment that "there is always more of stimulus, more of success, more of life, less of conceit, less of narrowness, of sectarianism, of knottiness, in large classes and in large colleges than in small ones." It favors the daily recitation and examination plan of American institutions, instead of the lecturing system of instruction used in Europe. It pleads for endowed Fellowships for rewards and encouragements to superior scholars, and competitive examinations for public office, instead of appointments for political partisanship. It says a good word for religion in colleges.

The Limits of Philosophical Inquiry. Address before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution. By the ARCHBISHOP OF YORK. pp. 27.

On the Physical Basis of Life. By T. H. HUXLEY, LL.D., F. R. S. From the "Fortnightly Review." February, 1869.

Archbishop Thomson is well known by his acute work on the Laws of Thought. His address is a protest against the denial of religious and spiritual ideas made by some physicists on the ground that inductive investigation does not yield them, and a caveat against the tendency to ascribe everything in mind and morals to a material origin. He argues three points: 1. That when the inductive logic has exhausted the system of nature, a divine causation is necessary to explain its being a system. "None but the wise can make things that show wisdom." The order of nature "touches on the miraculous at either end." Science cannot explain creation, but the universal belief in a God does. 2. That the harmonies of purposes of creation are not fortuitous, but ordered by benevolence. Inductive philosophy may decline to infer anything from the facts, but it is impossible to ignore the creative ideas that run through creation. The harmony between our own organization and the constitution of the world betrays one origin. 3. Our moral and voluntary powers argue a lawgiver who dictates our living above our mere wants and enjoyments, and that we shall choose Him. No materialistic philosophy can explain these powers. It is a philosophy tempting us to no moments of despair; it is good for arranging facts, but it cannot give us truths.

Prof. Huxley, after discoursing of "protoplasm," or life in matter itself material, turns to the limits of philosophical inquiry, and denies that materialism is materialistic. He controverts Dr. Thomson's ascribing the "New Philosophy" to Comte, and ridicules Comte himself as utterly wanting in science. There is one kind of matter common to all living beings. He holds all forms of life resolvable into this, "The acts of all living things are fundamentally one." A nettle and a corpuscle of the blood contain the same protoplasm. It is the unit of the human body. There is a general uniformity in it, no matter what group of living beings may be studied. Its origin is an arrangement of molecules. It depends on the pre-existence of three things—carbonic acid, water and ammonia. Carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen are themselves lifeless bodies; but brought together under certain conditions they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm, and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life. "I see no break in this series of steps in molecular complication." Huxley quite scouts the term "vitality" as useless and unmeaning; thought is but the mere "expression of molecular changes (!) in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." "It is utterly impossible to prove that *anything whatever* may not be the effect of a material and necessary cause, and human logic is equally incompetent to prove that any act is really spontaneous." "The progress of science has in all ages meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." "As surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law," (i. e., constant fact in matter, that is all law means to Huxley, *et id omne genus*), "until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action." "In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter; matter may be regarded as a form of thought, thought may be regarded as a property of matter. The further science advances, the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of nature be represented by materialistic formulæ and symbols."

Is any one startled by finding that *such* a writer and thinker declares that it is certain he is "no materialist," but "on the contrary believes materialism to involve grave philosophical error?"

To be perfectly fair and just, let us give his own explanation of the phenomena: "After all, what do we know of this terrible 'matter,' except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of *states of our own consciousness*? And what do we know of that 'spirit' over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising, like that which was heard at the death of Pan, except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause, or condition of 'states of consciousness'? In other words, matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena." "But if it is certain that we can have no knowledge of the nature of either matter or spirit, * * * the materialistic position that there is nothing in the world but matter, force and necessity, is as utterly devoid of justification as the most baseless of theological dogmas." Q. E. D.

After this, it will not be surprising that Dr. Bushnell can deny that the sufferings of Christ are the ground of forgiveness and justification, and yet it be claimed that he recognizes all the factors of the Atonement!

The Sanctuary for Meat and Medicine. A Dedication Sermon at Mitchell, Iowa. By LYMAN WHITING, D.D. Dubuque.

The text is from Ezekiel, 47:12, and the sermon fresh and sprightly. A little singular in its construction, it sets forth the nourishing and healing uses of the Sanctuary in an unusually interesting and crisp style, and the author shows much ingenuity in bringing about the short and direct application of the theme to the varied classes of persons and subjects with whom and which the Sanctuary has to do.

The Recent Progress of Science, &c. Address before the American Association Advancement of Science. Chicago, 1868. By Pres. BARNARD, Col. Coll.

A little more than half of these fifty pages is occupied—and well occupied—with a discussion of the Asserted Identity of the Mental Powers with Physical Forces. Dr. Barnard very strenuously resists the notion that all truth is to be explained some day by physical law, and denies that physics can give any scientific or philosophical information beyond its own domain. He traces the history of the doctrine of the conservation and correlation of forces from its first suggestion in mechanics down through Rumford's experiments demonstrating that heat is transformed force, to the present knowledge of the equivalency between heat, light, electricity, chemical

action, and molar energy. The conclusion is that the law underlies and controls *all physical* phenomena.

But he contests Herbert Spencer's position that we know this law by intuition, which one would think was sufficiently demonstrated in the fact that most of the human race do not know it at all! Experience, in any case, he urges, must tell us the quantitative equivalents of force under its various forms. He observes that we use the term force in respect to living bodies—as force of sensibility, will, intelligence, emotion, conscience, because of the poverty of language. He admits that growth in the vegetable is transmutation of force to a certain extent; but the vital principle is more than carbonic acid and heat, and has no equivalent in soil or sun. "Vital force" he considers a misnomer. And no combination of *forces* can make one blade of grass grow without it. Moreover, it is able to reverse the law of equilibrium which prevails in the natural forces, mechanical and chemical. It makes physical forces act as they do not without it, as when light and chemical affinity are interchanged in the growing plant. This influence of the vital principle cannot be explained as of the nature of a force, or explained at all. It passes all philosophical inquiry.

Passing up to mental and spiritual life, he says, "The philosophy which makes thought (and mind) a form of force makes thought a mode of motion;" it is "no less materialistic than that of Hobbes or Spinoza;" "Life is but a causal condition of matter;" "Freedom of will is an illusion," and the will a mere piece of mechanism, without the poor respectability of being the slave of motive, as in the old necessitarian philosophy. Or, as Huxley would say, we know no distinction between a will and a machine! But the physicist knows that thought admits of no measure, and cannot, therefore, be a physical force. No unit of measurement with each other is possible. This is the very argument used by some against admitting that a *science* of mind is possible. Consciousness is a more inexplicable and incalculable phenomenon than even the vital principle. It is the rock on which the theory splits. "A thing that is insusceptible of measure cannot be a quantity, and a thing that is not even a quantity cannot be a force." "The measurability of a quantity of thought is not even conceivable." Again, mental impressions are not at all proportioned to the forces impressed upon the sense. And again, they are determined by the *ideas* momentarily associated with these impressions. "We gain nothing whatever, even in the way of simplifying our philosophy, by contradict-

ing our intuitions, resisting our instinctive convictions, and abjuring our faith." The address is a thoroughly able one.

Evening by Evening; or, Readings at Eventide. By C. H. SPURGEON. pp. 400. New York: Sheldon & Company, and Gould & Lincoln. 1869. For sale by Gould & Lincoln.

A valuable book to aid in the devotions of the evening. The author has been unusually fortunate in these evening readings in avoiding the beaten, and, we might add, forsaken, road common to such works. There is a freshness and a charm, a warm and cheering heart-feeling about these pages. The scripture headings are not those a common mind would have taken, and the thoughts drawn from them are often gems in beautiful settings and radiant with light.

A Scripture Manual, Alphabetically and Systematically arranged. Designed to facilitate the finding of proof texts. By CHARLES SIMMONS. Second stereotype revision. Thirty-sixth Edition. New York: M. W. Dodd. Boston: H. A. Young. pp. 750. 1869.

The long and general use of this valuable work renders it necessary that we should speak only of the improvements made in this revision. It claims to have over one hundred additional topics, a much more full and perfect index, and no little gain in the relevancy of its proof texts. In the preparation of sermons, we have always found this book one of most constant reference.

The Gospel Treasury and Expository Harmony; of the Four Evangelists, in the words of the authorized version, having scriptural illustrations; expository notes from the most approved commentators; practical reflections; geographical notices; copious index, &c. Compiled by ROBERT MIMPRISS, Author of the system of graduated simultaneous instruction, &c., &c. Two volumes in one. New York: M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway. Boston: H. A. Young. 1869. pp. 750. price \$3.50.

This book has one great fault, and that is, crowding so much matter, of the highest possible value to all students and even readers of the Bible, into so small a space as to fill the pages to plethora and diminish the type to uselessness to any but young and sharp eyes. Of the contents and value of the book, especially to Sabbath School teachers, we readily affirm all that its full and complete title page claims. The "Sunday School Times" gives it the highest praise, and refers to great reductions in the price to Sabbath School

teachers. It is not an ordinary commentary, but a beautiful Harmony of the Life of Christ, attended by the chief results of all the critical study of modern times. He who can possess and read it is fortunate.

Oldtown Folks. By HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, Author of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," etc. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co., successors to Ticknor & Fields. pp. 608. 1869. \$2.

Another of Mrs. Stowe's characteristic stories of New England life in the ante-railroad times. It is very interesting reading, though we find some things in nearly all this author's writings which we do not like. The style is racy, and there are keen specimens of satire and the ludicrous against the ministers and Christians of those early Calvinistic times. But other things far worse than ministers and Christians are shown up, and we can afford to take the bitter with the sweet when the whole dish is so rich and entertaining as this volume is.

Mexico and the United States. By Dr. G. D. ABBOTT. Published by Putnam & Son, N. Y.; and *Office and Work of the Christian Ministry.* By Prof. JAMES M. HOPPIN. Sheldon & Co., N. Y. Lee & Shepard, Boston.

These are two volumes too important to be passed with such short notice as we have room for in this number. Let no one hesitate to buy them, as we will show in our next issue that they are to exert a marked influence upon the Christian activities of our times.

THE ROUND TABLE.

SCOTCH PRESBYTERIANISM. A Scotch delegate to the Congregational Union of England and Wales bore this testimony: "We have been leavening the other communities in Scotland with our principles. The Presbyterian churches are more Congregational than they once were; their Presbyterianism is softening, and becoming, if not less pronounced in words, less angular, or less sharp in the angles, and allowing much more liberty to individual ministers and congregations."

An American Presbyterian, of the "New School" branch, on returning from a foreign tour, declared that his views of ecclesiasticism had changed; observation of arbitrary forms of government abroad had taught him—what Congregationalists knew very well before—that these forms have no advantage at all over Congregationalism as fences against error. It was long ago understood in New England, and among men of New England education, that more Unitarianism and rationalism have developed in foreign Presbyterianism than under the polity of the Pilgrim Fathers.

Dr. Bushnell's theological vagaries furnish a recent illustration of the best way to treat error in some one point of doctrine. A national church, a consolidated and strong government, would have attempted pains and penalties (ecclesiastical) for his denial of Atonement, and in the boundless logomachy and hair-splitting which would have been resorted to in his defence, to say nothing of possible perversions and misrepresentations and all sorts of unfair views, a good many would have been entangled, and the "heresy" would have spread itself. Left to the logicians and expert theologians, to criticism and analysis, to the quiet disclaimers of sound Congregationalists and local bodies, to discussions in associations and reviews, the thing has proved almost powerless for self-propagation. Two or three men have spoken for it in apology, or attempted explanation, or semi-defence. A single evangelical journal, the "Advance," has intimated that the "Moral View" could be reconciled with the orthodox doctrine it attempts to overthrow. The thing "hath this extent, no more." Universal Congregationalism quietly drops it into that limbo of disallowance and forgetfulness into which so many theological fantasies have sunk before it. To our churches at large it will soon be as though the book had never been.

ENGLISH REPRINTS. A most praiseworthy enterprise of Alex. Murray & Son, of London, is the reproduction of certain rare books of earlier English authors. In private libraries it is quite impossible to possess any considerable number of such books, and how to get even a small selection of them it has been a perplexity to discover. In a monthly issue of small volumes—a “handy volume” series—which has now run up to twenty-five, Murray & Son reproduce Milton, More, Addison, Latimer, Sidney, Roger Ascham, Bacon, Selden, Lyly, Sackville, Gascoigne, Sir Richard Grenville, Sir Thomas Eliot, and others less known. King James’s Counter Blast to Tobacco is included, and we hope some things of Sir Walter Raleigh’s will be. Sterry’s “Rise, Race, and Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the Soul of Man” is announced in the “Athenæum,” but whether in this series, or whether it is not too large a volume for such a series, we are not told. All that is good in English literature is not by any means known to this generation, and we trust that this literary revival will lead to a theological revival which will give large circulation to the noble works Professor Shedd proposes to reproduce. We shall have a more racy, pithy, arresting style of preaching when such books are common among our ministers.

COUNCILS. The disposition in England to adopt our American usage of Congregational councils increases. The late Dr. Robert Vaughan, on his return from our National Council, inaugurated the discussion, which still goes on. The “English Independent” lately urged the matter in two editorials. The lack of councils is admitted to be “a serious reproach against the (English) system.” “In expectation of the day when all churches shall be equal before the law, there is the utmost need,” they say in England, “that we should draw nearer together, sustain the weaker churches, promote inter-communion, and provide for the settlement of misunderstandings and the avoidance of unseemly discussions by some such system as that of the American councils.”

THE GENERAL ; OR, TWELVE NIGHTS IN THE HUNTERS’ CAMP, is worthy of another reference in this Review. We happen to be somewhat familiar with much of the scenery of this fresh and unique book, and can testify to its accuracy and verisimilitude. But any reader can perceive the wit, point and aptness of the charming pre-

faces to each of its twelve chapters. The interest of the whole is varied and piquant. Seldom has an autobiography of so much incident and breadth of locality had an editing and garnishing of so appetizing a character. It is one of the bright, live books of the year, utterly and intensely American, a genuine and quickening book—*sui generis*.

THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE. The movement inaugurated in London, in 1846, for the formation of an Alliance of Evangelical Christians, all over the world, with a view to promote objects of common and universal interest, has been attended with extraordinary success. More than twenty different branch organizations, in different countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and America, have already been formed. There have been five general conferences, held quadrennially, namely, in London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva and Amsterdam. The different branches have held many annual meetings for the discussion of important subjects.

At the last general meeting in Amsterdam, in 1867, the executive committee of the American branch of the Alliance extended an invitation to hold the next conference in New York. It was unanimously and most cordially accepted, and arrangements are in progress for the meeting in the autumn of 1870. The Rev. Dr. Schaff is now in Europe, on behalf of the committee, to secure the attendance of eminent divines and Christian philanthropists in Great Britain and on the continent, and to mature the programme for the papers and discussions to be brought forward. A fund of \$30,000 is to be raised in New York to defray all expenses, and to give free passage to many eminent men from abroad.

Preparatory to this great ecumenical council next year, representing thousands of Christian ministers and hundreds of thousands of the laity of almost all evangelical denominations in the world, there is to be held in New York, in the second week of October, this year, a three days' meeting of the members and friends of the American branch, to consider various subjects of special interest to American Christians.

The *first day* is to be devoted to the Roman Catholic and related questions; the *second day* to public morals and reforms, including political corruptions, social evils, prisons, temperance, Sabbath-breaking, &c.; the *third day* to evangelical efforts, immigrants, freedmen, revivals, &c.

The Evangelical Alliance, by its work in Europe, has already acquired a name and a power in the world. If the American

Alliance shall emulate the work of the European, it will confer immeasurable blessings upon our churches, our country, and our continent.

THE BOSTON TRACT SOCIETY has held two spirited meetings since the annual meeting in May, and still further demonstrated that it cannot go on much further as a separate society. There is a wide division of views (and *feelings*, too) in regard to its management, and the conviction is growing irresistible that two American Tract Societies are not needed and will not be sustained.

A marked change has developed itself in the Baptist denomination, in that they no longer oppose an equitable division of the assets of the society, but earnestly advocate it. They are now raising a fund to establish a strong branch of their Baptist Publishing Society here in Boston, and are coming rapidly to the conclusion at which Congregationalists are, more slowly but surely, coming, that Christian *work* is done best by denominations, while at the same time union of feeling and sympathy is steadily increasing among all Christians, and that it should manifest itself and find expression on platforms where management of funds and details of work are not required, but where the great object is the cultivation of Christian unity and the increase of love and zeal for the common cause.

It will be found at the next annual meeting that the only opposition to a dissolution of the society will come from the comparatively few Congregationalists, mostly laymen, who wish to run the society solely for the publication and charitable distribution of the Dublin style of tracts.

The report of the last committee of investigation showed a diminution of total receipts in the last two years of \$50,000, and an increase of expenses during the same time of \$15,000. The same report reduced the nominal assets of the society from \$160,000, as reported in May, to \$128,000.

But all things will work clear in a year or so more, and then we shall have peace.